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 In well-functioning domestic legal systems, courts provide a mechanism 
through which commitments and obligations are enforced.  A party that fails to 
honor its obligations can be brought before a court and sanctioned through 
seizure of person or property.  The international arena also has courts or, to 
expand the category somewhat, tribunals.  These institutions, however, lack the 
enforcement powers of domestic courts.  How, then, do they work, and how 
might they work better or worse?  The first objective of this Article is to establish 
that the role of the tribunal is to promote compliance with some underlying 
substantive legal rule.  This simple yet often-overlooked point provides a metric 
by which to measure the effectiveness of tribunals.  But a tribunal does not 
operate in isolation.  The use of a tribunal is one way to resolve a dispute, but 
reliance on diplomacy and other traditional tools of international relations is 
another.  Furthermore, even if a case is filed with a tribunal, there may be 
settlement prior to a ruling and, even if there is a ruling, the losing party may 
refuse to comply.  Understanding international tribunals, therefore, requires 
consideration of the entire range of possible outcomes to a dispute, including 
those that do not involve formal litigation.  The second goal of this Article is to 
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develop a rational-choice model of dispute resolution and tribunals that takes 
this reality into account.  The third goal is to explore, based on the above model, 
various features of international tribunals and identify those that increase 
effectiveness and those that reduce it.  Finally, the Article applies the analysis to 
help us understand two prominent tribunals:  the World Trade Organization’s 
Appellate Body and the United Nations Human Rights Committee.
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INTRODUCTION
International dispute resolution and international tribunals are all 
the rage.1  On the one hand, many international lawyers celebrate 
them as a powerful tool in the effort to bring order to our anarchic 
world.2  On the other hand, critics view these tribunals—perhaps in-
consistently—as both a threat and a waste of resources.3
1 See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:  Is 
It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267 (2001) (characterizing the proliferation of 
international tribunals as a viable, effective means of international dispute resolution); 
David Davenport, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:  What Does It 
Mean?, BRIEFLY . . . PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., & LITIG., May 2005, at 1 (arguing that the 
growth of international tribunals is the “most significant international development of 
our day” and predicting their increasing future importance); Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals:  A Response to Professors 
Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 910 (2005) (explaining that “[w]ithin the past dec-
ade the world has witnessed an explosion of international adjudication”); Benedict 
Kingsbury, Foreword:  Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic 
Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679, 680 (1999) (introducing a series of papers 
that examine whether the expansion of international tribunals and courts is “fragment-
ing or system-building”); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Bodies:  The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999) (summarizing 
competing views on whether the growth of international tribunals has negative effects 
and whether there is, or should be, a uniform international legal system to demon-
strate the lack of consensus on the issues); Chester Brown, The Proliferation of Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals:  Finding Your Way Through the Maze, 3 MELB. J. INT’L L. 453, 
454 (2002) (book review) (noting that “[t]he establishment of new fora for third party 
dispute settlement is undoubtedly one of the more striking international legal devel-
opments in recent years”); Serbia Promises to Cooperate with Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2006, at A11 (noting Serbia’s cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal in 
The Hague);  Mark Turner & Roula Khalaf, UN Closer to Beirut Tribunal Resolution, FIN.
TIMES (USA), Apr. 5, 2007, at 4; Washington Post, International Court Rebuffed, CHI.
TRIB., June 29, 2006, § 1, at 6 (reporting on a U.S. Supreme Court decision that inter-
prets the Vienna Convention differently than the International Court of Justice (ICJ)). 
2 See Karen J. Alter, Do International Courts Enhance Compliance with International 
Law?, 25 REV. ASIAN & PAC. STUD. 51, 51 (2003) (arguing that “[o]ne of the main 
hopes of proponents of international courts is that international courts will in some 
way encourage greater respect for international law”); Jose E. Alvarez, The Move from 
Institutions?, Address at the 2006 Friedman Conference (Mar. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/law/csil/home%20page_files/Alvarez%20Friedmann%
20Address.pdf (describing how “[w]e continue to presume that we need to establish 
more formal [intergovernmental organizations] to make ever more international law, 
whether through judges, more multilateral treaties, or other forms of regulation”). 
3 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES
10 (2003) (maintaining that “[j]udges of international courts . . . are continuing to 
undermine democratic institutions and to enact the agenda of the liberal Left”); JER-
EMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 46-47 (1998) (arguing that high expectations 
174 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 171
This debate is both lively and important.  It has proceeded, how-
ever, with a very thin theory of what international tribunals do and 
why they work (or fail to work).  We lack a well-developed and tracta-
ble analysis of what international tribunals can or should achieve, how 
they can or should affect state behavior, or even what it means for a 
tribunal to be effective.  Until such questions are sorted out it is 
unlikely that any form of consensus can emerge on the role of inter-
national courts and tribunals. 
These institutions are important to the international legal system.  
To begin with, they are a useful tool for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Secondly, their decisions clarify international law in impor-
tant ways and, although usually not formally binding on states not 
party to a dispute, they establish a form of de facto international 
common law.  Furthermore, tribunals are politically salient because 
disputes are often played out in a (relatively) public context.  The 
presence of a tribunal can raise the stakes for the political leaders of 
the states involved.  Finally, an understanding of tribunals is critical to 
a more general understanding of international law, both as it cur-
rently exists and as it will develop in the future. 
This Article presents an analysis of what it means for tribunals to 
be effective and how they impact states.  It considers how these institu-
tions fit within the larger set of state interactions and describes the 
situations in which international tribunals can play a role.  It explicitly 
accounts for both the absence of formal enforcement schemes and 
the potential for states to disregard the work of these bodies. 
Methodologically, the Article uses a rational-choice approach, 
meaning that states are assumed to be rational, self-interested, and 
able to identify and pursue their interests.4  State interests are a func-
for international law may promote cynicism and backlash); John J. Mearsheimer, The 
False Promise of International Institutions, INT’L SEC., Winter, 1994–1995, at 7 (maintain-
ing that “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little 
promise for promoting stability in the post–Cold War world”); Jed Rubenfeld, Com-
mentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2022 (2004) (“If 
the United States means to remain self-governing, then international treaties—just as 
Washington said—always will be problematic, because they threaten to make our law 
answerable to international governance, rather than self-government”). 
4 I, like others, have defended the use of this approach in past writing and will not 
repeat those arguments here. See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008) [hereinafter GUZMAN, HOW INTER-
NATIONAL LAW WORKS] (explaining how international law can affect state behavior by 
looking at various sources of international law within a single framework); Andrew T. 
Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 579 (2005) [herein-
after Guzman, Design] (analyzing why states may prefer to draft international agree-
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tion of the preferences of states, which are assumed to be given, or 
exogenous, and fixed.  The analysis is institutionalist in approach, and 
so differs in its underlying assumptions both from the traditional real-
ist approach advanced by, for example, Mearsheimer,5 and from the 
liberal theory approach adopted by, for example, Helfer and Slaugh-
ter.6  Realists build a hostility to cooperation among states into their 
models of international interaction by assuming that states care 
mostly, and perhaps only, about relative gains and losses.7  As a result, 
even when cooperation makes all parties better off, it will likely be 
frustrated because some of the parties will gain less than others and 
will therefore refuse to participate.  The institutionalist approach 
taken in this Article assumes instead that states are interested in abso-
lute gains.  It is well-established that international cooperation is pos-
sible under these assumptions.8  Liberal theory seeks to “deconstruct” 
the states and focus on substate actors.  There is no doubt that domes-
tic politics influences state behavior, so there is a strong argument to 
be made for taking it into account.  The difficulty is that we lack good 
models of domestic politics that can be applied to the general ques-
tion of how tribunals affect international behavior.9
Though the vast majority of international legal commitments 
come without mandatory dispute-resolution provisions, a number of 
international bodies have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes among 
states or between states and private parties.10  The best known of these 
are the International Court of Justice (ICJ),11 the World Trade Or-
ments in a way that makes them less credible and easier to violate); Andrew T. 
Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002) 
[hereinafter Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory] (arguing that states consider reputa-
tional consequences when deciding whether to comply with international law because 
they are rational and self-interested). 
5 Mearsheimer, supra note 3. 
6 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997). 
7 See Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, INT’L SEC.,
Fall 1999, at 5 (proposing a reformulation of realism that focuses on conflict and ma-
terial power). 
8 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 4. 
9 See supra note 4.  
10 As discussed infra Part II.A, the precise list of international tribunals varies 
based on how one defines the category. 
11 The ICJ is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations. It is available to 
virtually every country in the world for the resolution of disputes, but no state can be 
forced to appear before the court without having previously consented to the court’s 
jurisdiction.  That consent can take one of three forms, all provided for in the Statute 
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ganization (WTO) and its mandatory dispute-resolution system,12 the 
European Court of Human Rights,13 the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),14 and arbitration bodies such as the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).15
The structure of these and other dispute-resolution systems varies 
considerably.  For instance, decisions of the ICJ are binding only on 
the parties litigating the case.16  In contrast, all members of the ICSID 
are required to recognize and enforce all arbitral awards.17  The WTO 
system establishes a right to appeal a decision, whereas most other 
of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].  
Under Article 36.2, a state can recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ over matters of in-
ternational law.  Id. at 1042; Article 37 states that jurisdiction can be provided through 
treaty; or the parties may refer a case to the ICJ through special agreement, as provided 
under Article 36.1. Id. at 1042-43.  The decisions of the Court are binding upon the 
parties and the Court may refer matters to the United Nations Security Council. 
12 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism was established at the same time as 
the WTO itself in 1995, upon completion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).  Membership in 
the WTO—currently held by 149 states—requires submission, without reservation, to 
the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement bodies.  The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism has two tiers.  At the first level are dispute-settlement panels composed on 
an ad hoc basis in consultation with the disputing parties.  Parties can appeal panel 
rulings to the Appellate Body, which consists of a seven-member permanent body, with 
individual appeals heard by three of the seven members.  The decisions of the panel 
and the Appellate Body are binding upon the parties unless there is a consensus 
among WTO members—including the disputing parties—to refuse to adopt the deci-
sion.  If a losing defendant is unable or unwilling to bring its trade practice into com-
pliance with the ruling, the Dispute Settlement Body can authorize the “suspension of 
concessions,” that is, impose trade sanctions. 
13 The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 as one of three 
institutions charged with enforcing the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950.  
14 ITLOS is the adjudicatory branch of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea.  The Convention provides four alternative means for the settlement of dis-
putes:  ITLOS, the ICJ, and two types of arbitral tribunals, with arbitration serving as 
the default procedure if the parties have not chosen one of the alternatives.  ITLOS is 
composed of twenty-one permanent judges, each serving nine-year terms, nominated 
and elected by the 150 member states.  The rulings of the Tribunal or the arbitration 
panel are final and binding upon the parties to the dispute, though there is no en-
forcement or monitoring mechanism.  The default arbitration option provides for 
panels of five arbitrators chosen by the parties and the issuance of a binding decision. 
15 For a longer list, see Brown, supra note 1, at 455-57 and THE PROJECT ON INT’L
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC 
CHART (2004), available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/ 
Synop_C4.pdf. 
16 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1046. 
17 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States art. 54, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 515 U.N.T.S. 159. 
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dispute settlement systems do not.18  The ITLOS tribunal, the ICJ, and 
the WTO Appellate Body have permanent judges, while WTO panels 
and arbitral approaches typically feature the ad hoc appointment of 
judges or arbitrators. 
The diversity of approaches to dispute resolution provides a chal-
lenge.  Highly contextualized analysis can generate a more accurate 
portrait of a single institution but makes it difficult to extract lessons 
applicable across a range of dispute settlement strategies.  A more ab-
stract approach, on the other hand, promises more general lessons 
but may omit important features of tribunals that are critical to how 
they function.  This Article seeks to shed light on the general working 
of tribunals rather than on a single institution, and so it adopts a fairly 
general theoretical approach.  This strategy is not hostile to a more 
particularized approach.  Rather, the two methods complement one 
another; undoubtedly both are required to advance our understand-
ing of international tribunals.  Indeed, Part V of this Article looks 
more closely at two specific tribunals both to contextualize the analysis 
and to illustrate how we might apply lessons of the Article in particu-
lar cases. 
Even at a general level, however, tribunals vary sufficiently enough 
that the theoretical tools used herein cannot address their full range 
of diversity.  Where the assumptions required for the analysis are in-
appropriate, the relevant tribunals must be put to one side.  This is 
the case for three categories of tribunals. 
First, this Article does not consider international tribunals before 
which the defendants are individuals.  These include, for example, the 
International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  These tribunals have ac-
cess to coercive enforcement power over defendants, which makes 
their operation fundamentally different from the tribunals studied 
here.
Second, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is put to one side for 
purposes of this analysis.  Because of the peculiar structure of the 
European Union (EU), interactions among EU member states in 
some ways resemble the interactions among the fifty United States 
more than they resemble cooperation among sovereign states.  Fur-
18 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994), at art. 17 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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thermore, the level of integration achieved within the European Un-
ion is unprecedented, and the costs of systematically failing to behave 
cooperatively within that framework are very high.  Conceivably, the 
theory developed here could be applied to the ECJ because the basic 
theoretical structure is relevant.  I prefer to exclude this tribunal from 
the discussion because the magnitudes of the payoffs are quite differ-
ent from those of other tribunals, and assumptions that may be ap-
propriate for other tribunals may not apply to the ECJ. 
Finally, the analysis deals primarily with tribunals that feature 
compulsory jurisdiction—those in which a defendant cannot simply 
reject the jurisdiction of the tribunal at the time of the dispute.  Most 
of the Article assumes that there has been some prior consent to ju-
risdiction that binds the defendant from the moment the complaint is 
filed.  This assumption is relaxed,  however, later in the Article.19
I. WHAT DO TRIBUNALS DO?
A.  Courts Without Coercion 
To understand international tribunals, it is helpful to start with 
the most fundamental question:  what are they supposed to achieve?  
Much of the existing debate on international courts overlooks this 
important question and implicitly assumes that the role of these tri-
bunals is essentially the same as that of domestic courts.  This confu-
sion is understandable given that in many ways these institutions have 
the look and feel of domestic courts.  They often call themselves 
courts, have adjudicators or arbitrators who are referred to as judges, 
feature an adversarial system, rely on legal arguments, publish rea-
soned opinions that resemble domestic court rulings, and are charged 
with issuing legally binding rulings intended to resolve disputes.20
Nevertheless, the institutional context in which international tri-
bunals operate is sufficiently different from that of domestic courts to 
make the role of the international tribunal fundamentally different 
from that of the domestic courts.  The critical difference between 
domestic and international courts is that the former are backed by a 
system of coercive enforcement.  In the context of a domestic dispute, 
the failure of a losing party to comply with the ruling of a court, or to 
19 See infra Part IV.F.2. 
20 See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981) (comparing various legal traditions and formulating a generally applicable the-
ory of comparative law). 
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satisfy the winning party in some other way, leads to sanctions—most 
typically a seizure of property or person.  This threat of coercive en-
forcement is foundational to the functioning of domestic systems.21
In contrast, when a state loses before an international tribunal, no 
formal legal structure exists to enforce the ruling.  The assets of the 
noncompliant state will not be seized, nobody will be arrested, and the 
state will not even lose its ability to file complaints.  If international tri-
bunals are effective, it must be for some reason other than the system of 
coercive enforcement that accompanies a domestic court’s decision.22
To get an idea of how and why international tribunals might mat-
ter to states, it is helpful to consider the most basic description of ex-
actly what they do.  The mechanism through which state behavior is 
affected by a tribunal must, after all, begin with some action by that 
tribunal.  Reduced to its simplest components, a tribunal hears evi-
dence and arguments from the parties and issues a ruling regarding 
the relevant facts and law.  At that point its job is done; it generally 
does not supervise or enforce compliance with its decisions.23  In 
other words, the tribunal simply announces the relevant legal rules 
and, in the context of those rules, its interpretation of events.  Its sole 
contribution to the dispute is information concerning what hap-
pened, what law governs, and how the law applies to the facts.  What-
ever impact international tribunals have, then, must be the result of 
the ruling itself and the information in that ruling. 
This observation—that tribunals serve to provide information—
guides the analysis that follows.  The goal here is to develop a theory 
21 Even within the domestic sphere, this potential for sanctions does not always 
exist.  For example, should the President disregard an order from the courts of the 
United States, there may be no coercive mechanisms available to enforce the ruling. 
Nevertheless, domestic court rulings generally are enforceable. 
22 This is, of course, just one manifestation of the general problem of a lack of en-
forcement in international law.  For years, international lawyers have been forced to 
defend the relevance of international law against the charge that in the absence of en-
forcement there is no “law” and the relevant rules cannot affect state behavior.  See,
e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) 
(arguing that international law is based on rational state actors pursuing their own self 
interests); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations 
Theory:  A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993) (describing the rise of an interna-
tionalist agenda as theoretical approaches to the study of international law). 
23 Some tribunals, such as the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, give winning 
parties the opportunity to argue that a losing defendant has failed to comply.  Even in 
these situations, however, the tribunal can only issue another ruling that the defendant 
has failed to comply—assuming it concludes that the complainant’s assertion is correct. 
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capable of explaining how information can influence state behavior 
and encourage compliance with international law. 
B.  The Influence of Information 
There are two kinds of information dissemination that might al-
low a tribunal to influence states.  First, dissemination may assist the 
parties in reaching a common understanding regarding relevant facts 
or law, and thereby assist in reaching a mutually agreeable settlement.  
It may achieve this through a conventional adversarial process, 
through something more akin to mediation, or through something in 
between.  Once the parties have a shared understanding of events, 
they may be able to reach a settlement that was previously unavailable.  
This is a process of overcoming informational asymmetries rather 
than one of assigning blame.  It is a potential role for bodies that are 
authorized to receive complaints and facilitate communication be-
tween the parties but are not authorized to issue rulings.  The Con-
vention Against Torture (CAT),24 for example, establishes the Com-
mittee Against Torture which serves as a sort of mediator between 
disputing states.25  Disputing parties are to negotiate with one another 
for a period of six months, after which either one may refer the mat-
ter to the Committee.26  The Committee holds closed meetings when 
examining communications,27 makes available its “good offices to the 
States Parties,” sets up an ad hoc conciliation commission when ap-
propriate,28 and delivers a report.  The report, however, is not a “rul-
ing”; it is instead simply a description of the dispute.29  Even in the ab-
sence of a formal ruling, however, the process may generate 
information and thereby facilitate settlement. 
24 G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984), available at 
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html [hereinafter CAT]. 
25 This assumes that both parties have recognized the competence of the Committee 
Against Torture for this purpose.  Id. art. 21. 
26 Id. art. 21.1(b). 
27 Id. art. 21.1(d). 
28 Id. art. 21.1(e). 
29 See id. art. 21.1(h)(ii) (“[T]he Committee shall confine its report to a brief 
statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions 
made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.”).  The report is 
to follow the description in the text if the parties have failed to reach a mutually satis-
factory solution.  If the parties are able to reach such a solution, the report provides 
even less information, limiting itself to “a brief statement of the facts and of the solu-
tion reached.”  Id. art. 21.1(h)(i). 
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In addition, of course, the tribunal announces whether one party 
has violated the law.  This allows the parties and other states to form a 
more accurate assessment of the challenged behavior, generates repu-
tational consequences for a violation, and makes retaliation or recip-
rocal noncompliance more likely and more acceptable to the rest of 
the international community.30
This is the function, for example, of dispute resolution at the 
WTO.  To be sure, the actions of WTO panels and the WTO’s Appel-
late Body often promote settlement, but they also rule on the question 
of whether the defendant has violated WTO law.  If a state does not 
bring itself into compliance—or satisfy the complainant in some other 
way—the complainant can obtain authorization to respond with trade 
measures of its own.  Wrongdoers, then, face both reputational and 
retaliatory consequences when they lose a case. 
The two functions mentioned above are, of course, not mutually 
exclusive.  Providing accurate information about the facts and the law 
can serve both to promote settlement and to increase the cost of viola-
tion.  In some instances, however, one function will dominate the 
other.  If a tribunal’s ruling is confidential, for example, this will tend 
to serve the interests of settlement rather than sanction.  The same 
will be true if the parties have a significant degree of control over the 
adjudicators.  In this latter case the tribunal is not disinterested and so 
is less likely to arrive at reliable conclusions regarding the facts or the 
law.  In the course of the proceedings, however, the parties may over-
come critical informational asymmetries. 
These different functions lead to different observed outcomes.  
When courts serve primarily to promote settlement, for example, we 
expect the parties to abide by that settlement.  Rational parties will 
only settle a dispute if they reach an agreement and the promise to 
abide by the settlement is credible.  It is to be expected, then, that the 
rate of “compliance” with the settlement will be high.  This simply re-
flects the fact that both parties prefer the settlement to the alternative 
of a continued dispute.  Put another way, a settlement is similar to 
other forms of agreement in international law—e.g., treaties—and so 
we should expect similar rates of compliance. 
30 See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 4, at 33-48 (arguing 
that states are rational actors and that the reputational consequences of their actions 
factor into their analysis of their own behaviors); see also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 
1, at 931-36 (arguing that tribunals act as trustees that enhance the credibility of prom-
ises governments make). 
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When courts serve to apportion wrongdoing, on the other hand, 
the final decision does not require the consent of the parties.  Given 
that there is no coercive enforcement scheme in the background, one 
would expect a lower level of compliance than in the settlement con-
text.  The losing party retains the option of ignoring the judgment 
and living with whatever consequences come with that choice.  This is, 
for example, what the European Communities (EC)31 has done in the 
EC—Hormones case at the WTO.32  Rather than abide by the decision 
of the WTO’s Appellate Body, the EC has continued its illegal activity 
and lives with the WTO-approved sanctions imposed by the United 
States and Canada.33
C.  Why Is a Tribunal Necessary? 
If the role of a tribunal is simply to provide information, one 
might wonder why states cannot achieve the same result by them-
selves.  Why can’t they simply enter into negotiations with one an-
other, exchange information, and arrive at the same decision?  One 
answer is that states often do exactly this.  Many disputes are resolved 
without recourse to formal dispute-resolution procedures, even when 
that option is available.  Indeed, the ability of states to replicate the 
tribunal’s function may help to explain why only a small fraction of 
international legal obligations is subject to formal dispute resolution.34
31 The European Union is referred to as the European Communities in WTO matters. 
32 Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998). 
33 The case continues to generate activity at the WTO.  Most recently the WTO’s 
Appellate Body heard arguments by the EC to the effect that the sanctions put in place 
by Canada and the United States were impermissible.  At the time of writing, the Ap-
pellate Body had not yet ruled on this issue.  See Panel Report, Canada—Continued Sus-
pension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/R (Mar. 31, 2008); Panel 
Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS320/R (Mar. 31, 2008). 
34 From a negotiating-theory perspective, it should not come as a surprise that 
states would want to design a mechanism to make their commitments more credible 
and more enforceable.  Indeed, from this perspective, one might wonder why states do 
not use dispute-resolution clauses in all of their agreements.  I have addressed this is-
sue in past writing, arguing that the sanctions in international law—specifically, reputa-
tion, retaliation, and reciprocity—impose costs on the parties (i.e., they are negative 
sum) rather than simply transferring value from one party to the other (i.e., zero sum).  
States must, therefore, balance the cost these negative-sum sanctions impose in the 
event of a violation against the benefits that will accrue through compliance with the 
enforcement mechanism.  See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility:  Explaining 
Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002), for 
further elaboration. 
2008] International Tribunals 183
When tribunals are used, one of their functions is to sort and 
evaluate information more effectively than states are able to do them-
selves.  Once states are in a dispute, they have opposing interests and 
thus have an incentive to provide misleading or inaccurate informa-
tion and to interpret the available information in a light favorable to 
their own position.  Without a third party to rule on points of dis-
agreement, the parties to the dispute may have difficulty reaching an 
unbiased account of events.  In other words, a tribunal may reduce 
the transaction costs associated with negotiation conducted between 
the states themselves. 
A tribunal can also help observing states, which are not party to 
the negotiations and have less information to begin with, understand 
the situation.  Providing these states with information at a low cost is 
useful because it allows them to adjust their beliefs about the willing-
ness of the parties to comply with legal obligations.  This enhances the 
impact of international law by increasing the reputational conse-
quences of a violation, making reciprocal noncompliance by third 
parties a possibility and retaliation by third parties more likely. 
D.  Strategic Tribunals 
Before turning to the development of a model of dispute resolu-
tion, it is worth taking a moment to discuss the goals of the tribunals 
themselves.  For simplicity, it is assumed initially that tribunals do not 
have an agenda other than attempting to provide a ruling on the legal 
question before them.  This assumption allows us to develop the basic 
model of tribunal behavior, but it is clearly an inaccurate assumption 
for many—and perhaps all—tribunals. 
First, a tribunal may acquire an agenda of its own, distinct from 
any legitimate authority delegated to it by states, and it may use its au-
thority to pursue that agenda.  The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) exemplifies this sort of behavior.35
The specter of a runaway tribunal is, of course, a concern for 
states when they consider the creation of such an entity.  Though 
some safeguards can be put in place when tribunals are formed—
giving states power over judges, retaining control of the institution’s 
budget, etc.—there remains a risk that a tribunal will run amok and 
behave differently than states intended.  Such misbehavior by a tribu-
nal can be represented in one of two ways.  First, a tribunal may be bi-
35 See infra Part V.B. 
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ased, meaning that it may develop interests that correspond to the in-
terests of a subset of the participating states.  The way in which this 
development will affect perceptions of the tribunal and the impact of 
its decisions is discussed in Part IV.C.  Another possibility is that the 
tribunal will develop some other set of priorities and goals, distinct 
from those of any state party.  These priorities and goals might involve 
an enlargement of the tribunal’s power and jurisdiction, the ad-
vancement of a particular view of the law, or some other objective.  
From the perspective of states, a tribunal that develops its own objec-
tives suffers a reduction in quality in the sense that it does not ade-
quately fulfill the objectives of the states.  The impact of this loss of 
quality is analyzed in Part IV.B. 
A second way in which tribunals may act strategically is by tailoring 
their judgments to the political realities of the situation before them.  
A tribunal might, for example, avoid issuing a ruling that it expects 
will be ignored by the parties.  The strategy of the tribunal in this 
situation is to avoid too severe a deviation from the preferences of 
states.  In particular the court may seek a resolution capable of gener-
ating acceptance and compliance by both sides.  Because tribunals 
appeal to states by accommodating the latter’s ex post preferences, 
this form of strategic conduct is tantamount to an increase in the tri-
bunal’s dependence on the states.  That is, as the tribunal tries to sat-
isfy the parties, it must adjust its rulings to avoid a negative reaction.  
This is the same behavior one would expect from a more dependent 
tribunal, thus the discussion of dependence in Part IV.C applies to 
this form of strategic behavior. 
II. TRIBUNALS AND EFFECTIVENESS
A.  What Is a Tribunal? 
One could limit the definition of “international tribunals” to bod-
ies that have explicitly been granted authority by the parties to rule on 
the legality of disputed conduct.  This definition would produce a set 
of tribunals that most closely resembles national courts in the sense 
that they have clear jurisdictional authority and are authorized to re-
solve the legal questions in a case.36  It would include, for example, 
contentious cases before the ICJ and the WTO’s judicial organs. 
36 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 285 n.35 (adopting a similar definition). 
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And yet institutions sometimes address disputes in contexts that 
fall outside the scope of this definition but nevertheless fulfill some 
adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory functions.  The ICJ, for example, 
issues advisory opinions which are different in character from a classic 
conventional adjudication.  When it does so, it is not acting in a man-
ner consistent with the above definition of a tribunal, but it is none-
theless engaged in an activity that falls within the scope of this Article.  
When the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in the Israeli Wall case, for 
example, the opinion had an effect similar to that of a standard con-
tentious case.37
For the purposes of this Article, then, a broader definition is ap-
propriate.  Thus, a tribunal is defined here as a disinterested institu-
tion to which the parties have delegated some authority and that pro-
duces a statement about the facts of a case and opines on how those 
facts relate to relevant legal rules.38
This definition also captures instances in which a tribunal dis-
cusses the merits of a case while declining jurisdiction over the dis-
pute, as sometimes happens.  The paradoxical result in such cases is 
that the tribunal labels one party as the wrongdoer but imposes no 
formal guilt, sanction, or legal obligation.  Arguably the tribunal lacks 
the formal authority to rule on the legality of the conduct and so 
might not be considered a tribunal at all under a narrow definition of 
that term.  A ruling of this sort, however, does fall within the defini-
tion used in this Article.  In the 2003 Loewen case, for example, a 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunal issued a 
37 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 ( July 9).  Other advisory opinions that re-
semble contentious cases, in the sense that they impose costs on one or more states 
that resemble the model developed in this Article, include:  Interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 
I.C.J. 73 (Dec. 20); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opin-
ion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 ( June 21). 
38 This approach is broadly consistent with that used by the Project on Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals (PICT).  PICT was established in 1997 as a joint endeavor 
of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York University, and the 
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD). Since 
2002, PICT has been a joint undertaking of CIC and the Centre for International 
Courts and Tribunals, University College London.  PICT describes itself as the “only 
internationally based effort to address, with a comprehensive and holistic approach, all 
existing international courts and tribunals.”  See About PICT, http://www.pict-pcti. 
org/about/about.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008). 
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scathing ruling criticizing the injustice suffered by a Canadian corpo-
ration at the hands of Mississippi courts.39  In the same decision, how-
ever, the tribunal rejected the legal claims because in failing to appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court, Loewen did not exhaust his do-
mestic remedies.40  Thus, the tribunal generated reputational conse-
quences detrimental to U.S. interests while nevertheless invoking a 
procedural defense to avoid, among other things, the imposition of 
damages. 
Our broader definition also includes bodies that, though not for-
mally constructed as tribunals, nevertheless opine on the merits of 
disputes or behaviors in a way that resembles how a tribunal operates 
and that is described by the model developed in this Article.  Probably 
the best known example of such an institution is the HRC which was 
established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).41  The HRC’s task is to “study the reports submitted by the 
States Parties to the [ICCPR]” and “transmit its reports, and such gen-
eral comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties.”42
If states have opted, under Article 41 of the ICCPR, to recognize the 
competence of the HRC to consider communications to the effect 
that the state is not fulfilling it obligations, then the HRC also per-
forms a mediation role.43  If the parties are unable to resolve their dis-
pute, the HRC is to issue a report, but that report must be limited to 
“a brief statement of the facts,” and the HRC is to attach to its report 
the “record of the oral submissions.”44
Under these provisions, the HRC has at most a very circumscribed 
role in evaluating the merits of the claims made by states.  Neverthe-
less, it has taken on a more active role in commenting on submitted 
disputes and legal questions.  Whatever the legitimacy of this approach,
it falls within the scope of actions that this Article seeks to understand. 
39 Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 Award, ¶ 54, 
(2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (con-
cluding that “the conduct of the [U.S.] trial by the trial judge was so flawed that it con-
stituted a miscarriage of justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is 
understood in international law”). 
40 Id. at ¶ 167. 
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1996 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE 151-52 (1991) (noting that the HRC is limited in its binding effect 
as crafted by the ICCPR). 
42 ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 40.4. 
43 Id. art. 41. 
44 Id. art. 41.1(h)(ii). 
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B.  What Is an Effective Tribunal? 
It has already been emphasized that the primary role of an inter-
national tribunal is informational.  It follows that the value of a tribu-
nal depends on the extent to which the tribunal is perceived to pro-
vide an unbiased ruling.  This much is agreed upon by all commentators.45
Beyond a desire for tribunals to be unbiased, however, there is lit-
tle agreement on the features that improve tribunal performance.  To 
make any sort of judgment, however, we first must understand the dif-
ference between a “good” and a “bad” tribunal.  The current debate 
focuses on whether or not a tribunal is “effective,” but this term has 
not been defined satisfactorily.  In particular, measures of effective-
ness are not connected to the reasons that states set up tribunals in 
the first place. 
Some commentators have looked to a tribunal’s ability to generate 
compliance with its own rulings as a measure of effectiveness.46  This 
approach, however, does not consider the role of tribunals in the lar-
ger legal system.  In particular, a high rate of compliance with tribunal 
rulings does not necessarily imply that the tribunal is encouraging 
compliance with the underlying legal obligation.  A tribunal could get 
a high rate of compliance, for example, by ruling in favor of the de-
fendant in every case, or perhaps in favor of the more powerful party, 
regardless of the underlying merits, but this obviously would serve no 
useful purpose.  Slightly more realistically, a tribunal could ignore the 
relevant legal questions and simply seek to mimic the result that the 
parties would achieve through politics.  This would lead to a high rate 
of compliance but would not support the relevant legal rule.  Fur-
thermore, even when a state fails to comply with a tribunal’s ruling, 
the tribunal may be effective at promoting compliance if it imposes 
sufficient costs on the state to discourage future violations of the un-
derlying legal rule. 
45 See, e.g., GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 4; Tom Gins-
burg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy:  An Expressive Theory of Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004); Helfer & Slaughter, supra
note 1; Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005). 
46 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 283 (defining “effectiveness” as the abil-
ity of a tribunal “to compel a party of a dispute to defend against a plaintiff’s complaint 
and to comply with the resulting judgment”).  Nevertheless, in later writing Helfer and 
Slaughter acknowledge the elusiveness of a workable definition.  See Helfer & Slaughter, 
supra note 1, at 918 (“[O]ur adoption of this definition was more relative than absolute.”). 
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Others have relied on usage rates as a proxy for effectiveness.47
Theories of litigation and settlement, however, teach us that usage 
rates reveal nothing about a tribunal’s impact on states.48  This is so 
because the parties to litigation have an incentive to settle their dis-
putes prior to trial in order to save the costs of litigation, and they do 
so in the shadow of the tribunal.  If they find themselves actually liti-
gating a case, it is because something has frustrated the settlement, 
not because the court is effective.  A failure to settle may be caused by 
informational asymmetries or by the fact that states—or their lead-
ers—receive political payoffs from pursuing litigation.49  In either 
case, the decision to “use” the tribunal is a strategic choice by the state 
and is unrelated to the tribunal’s perceived effectiveness.50
This Article pursues a different approach, first considering the 
primary purpose of an international tribunal.  The most compelling 
potential purpose for a tribunal is to support some underlying legal 
obligation.  When states create dispute-resolution procedures they 
provide an enforcement mechanism for some set of international law 
rules.  The dispute-resolution provisions of the WTO, for example, do 
not exist for their own sake.  They are intended to increase compli-
ance with rules contained in the WTO Agreements.  This Article, 
therefore, defines effectiveness as the tribunal’s ability to enhance 
compliance with the associated substantive obligation.51
Notice that a tribunal’s ability to encourage compliance with un-
derlying legal rules is not a simple binary measure.  A tribunal that 
47 See, e.g., Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 28 (asserting that “one could measure 
effectiveness [of tribunals] through usage”).  Posner and Yoo use two additional meas-
urements of effectiveness:  compliance with the tribunal’s ruling and the “overall suc-
cess of the treaty regime that established the court.”  Id.  at 28-29. 
48 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Informa-
tion, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984) (proposing a model that identifies informational 
asymmetry as an important factor in determining the likelihood of settlement and 
concluding that proposed legal rules should be scrutinized for their potential effects); 
Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 
495-98 (1996) (discussing the effect of private information on the likelihood of settle-
ment).  Posner and Yoo acknowledge that all three of their measures are “highly im-
perfect,” Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 29, but they proceed with their argument 
nonetheless.
49 Because political payoffs need not be zero sum, it is possible that the payoff to 
the parties is higher from litigation than from settlement. 
50 A sufficiently ineffective tribunal will not be used at all, of course, if the cost of 
litigation exceeds the benefits of winning at the tribunal. 
51 Among other possible roles, a tribunal may operate to reduce the severity of 
conflict, to elaborate rules left unclear in the drafting of a treaty, or to provide political 
cover for domestic politicians. 
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provides some incentive to states but that fails to prevent all violations 
will be more effective than one that fails to provide any compliance 
incentive to the parties.  Effectiveness, then, is inevitably a relative 
measure. 
One more point regarding the above definition of effectiveness 
must be made clear.  Though tribunals exist primarily to encourage 
compliance with underlying legal obligations, it is not the case that 
the parties to an international agreement always want to maximize 
compliance.  If they did, they would always enter into agreements with 
robust dispute resolution, including some form of sanctioning 
mechanism.  States sometimes prefer instead to stop short of the 
strongest possible enforcement scheme.52  Greater effectiveness, then, 
is not necessarily a normatively desirable goal, and the discussions that 
follow are not meant to suggest that the international legal system 
does or should constantly strive for greater effectiveness. 
C.  What Is a “Binding” Ruling? 
Notice that effectiveness is not defined with reference to whether 
or not a tribunal’s decision is “binding” on the parties.  Nonbinding 
rulings, despite their lack of legal force, can influence party behavior.  
Prior to the establishment of the WTO in 1995, for example, the deci-
sions of General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) dispute-
resolution panels were not binding on the parties until they were 
adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties.  Because that adoption re-
quired a consensus of all GATT parties—including the losing party in 
the dispute—it was possible for a panel to issue a nonbinding ruling.53
Including nonbinding rulings inevitably leads to a fundamental 
question about tribunals and international law:  if there are both bind-
ing and nonbinding rulings, and if binding rulings lack coercive en-
forcement, what does “bindingness” mean? 
Imagine two tribunals that are identical in every respect except 
that one is said to issue binding rulings while the other is understood 
to produce nonbinding rulings.  The tribunals are otherwise equally 
52 I have offered an explanation for why states behave in this way in prior writing.  
See Guzman, Design, supra note 4 (arguing that strong international sanctions often 
create a net loss for the parties involved). 
53 Nonbinding rulings come about in other contexts as well, including advisory 
opinions of the ICJ and decisions by bodies that lack the authority to issue binding rul-
ings, such as the HRC. 
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capable, equally neutral, equally respected, and so on.54  Now suppose 
that both tribunals find that a defendant has violated international law 
and call upon that defendant to take some action as a result.  They 
may demand cessation of its violative behavior, compensation for the 
complainant, or some other action. 
By assumption, the tribunals are identical in terms of the informa-
tion they have and the quality of the judges, and so they reach the 
same judgment regarding the legality of the disputed conduct.  Fur-
thermore, the confidence that the parties or other states have in the 
accuracy of the ruling will be the same regardless of which tribunal is-
sues the decision.  It follows that when the tribunal reaches a conclu-
sion about the legality of the challenged conduct—putting aside for 
the moment the proposed remedy—that conclusion will carry equal 
force whether or not it is binding.  A finding of guilt, for example, will 
impose the same costs on the defendant whether or not the ruling is 
said to be binding. 
We are talking here of the cost borne by the defendant simply be-
cause the tribunal has declared that party to be in violation.  This cost 
may take the form of a reputational loss, reciprocal noncompliance by 
other states, or retaliation by others.  In the model that follows, this 
cost will be labeled “R.” R is not affected by the bindingness of the 
ruling because the finding of a violation simply provides information.  
It does not, by itself, implicate the question of whether the ruling is 
binding.
When a ruling includes a statement about what the losing defen-
dant must do, however, bindingness matters.  That a ruling is binding 
implies that it imposes a legal obligation on the losing defendant—
specifically, a legal obligation to comply with the tribunal’s order.  
This legal obligation operates much like any other obligation, and a 
failure to comply represents an additional violation with additional 
costs.55
54 One can imagine, for example, a pre-WTO GATT ruling.  It is binding if it is 
adopted unanimously by the Contracting Parties but nonbinding if it is not adopted.  
Whether it is adopted or not, however, it is the product of precisely the same quasi-
judicial process. 
55 Arguably, almost any binding ruling comes with a legal obligation because cus-
tomary international law requires states to cease illegal activities and to provide some 
form of reparations to affected states.  In practice it is clear that compensation is not 
always provided.  See Draft Articles of State Responsibility arts. 34-37, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 3–Aug. 10, 2001), available at
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One might ask why simply declaring the ruling to be binding in-
creases the cost of ignoring it.  An initial possibility is that a binding 
decision triggers domestic law enforcement in a way that nonbinding 
decisions do not.  Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-
Marie Slaughter term this “embeddedness” or “the extent to which 
dispute-resolution decisions can be implemented without govern-
ments having to take actions to do so.”56  A nonbinding ruling would 
not generate these domestic-law pressures to comply. 
Failure to comply with the tribunal can also signal that a state is 
prepared to ignore its obligations under international law (reputa-
tion),57 may lead to a refusal on the part of other states to comply with 
decisions of the tribunal when the noncompliant state is the com-
plainant (reciprocity), and may provoke some punitive sanction (re-
taliation).  Reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity—what I have called 
the “Three Rs of Compliance” in other writing—are mechanisms 
through which international law can affect state behavior, and they 
apply to the obligation to comply with the tribunal.58
Notice, however, that none of these reactions require that the de-
cision be “binding.”  A nonbinding ruling that includes a statement of 
what the losing defendant must do can have similar effects.59  Never-
theless, one would expect that, all else equal, a binding ruling will 
have a greater impact than a nonbinding one.  By agreeing to a system 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_56_ 10.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2008).
56 Robert O. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution:  Interstate and Transna-
tional, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 458 (2000). 
57 This reputational effect can be costly because future agreement becomes more 
difficult.  A refusal to honor a decision might, for example, make it difficult for a state 
to commit credibly to dispute resolution in future agreements.  This robs the state of 
one of the mechanisms available to make its future commitments more credible and, 
therefore, makes it more difficult to extract value in exchange for its future promises. 
58 GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 4, at 9. 
59 This point is consistent with the observed fact that nonbinding rulings often 
lead to compliance.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example, 
is a body that reviews petitions, interprets states’ human rights obligations, and issues 
nonbinding recommendations.  According to the Commission’s 2006 Annual Report, 
full compliance with their recommendations is relatively rare—only 1 out of 66 cases—
but partial compliance was achieved in a large majority of cases—48 out of 66 cases, or 
73%.  INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 49-54 
(2006), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/chapter.iii.eng.pdf.  
Furthermore, because the cases considered include ones in which it is uncertain 
whether compliance has taken place or is forthcoming, these figures understate the 
level of compliance.  Thus, well over half of the nonbinding recommendations lead to 
compliance.  Id. at 23-31.
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that includes binding dispute resolution, states make a greater com-
mitment, which means they pledge a larger amount of reputational 
capital.  A subsequent failure to comply will, therefore, impose a lar-
ger reputational cost than would be true if less reputation were 
pledged (i.e., if the ruling was considered nonbinding). 
Hypothesis:  Where a tribunal’s task is limited to opining on the legal-
ity of a particular action, but not ordering any specific measures to 
cure the violation, it makes no difference whether the ruling is binding 
or nonbinding. 
Hypothesis:  Where the tribunal’s task includes determining what the 
violating party must do to remedy the violation, a binding judgment 
will be more effective than a nonbinding one. 
These hypotheses offer an explanation for why the HRC has 
worked to give its “views” the look and feel of binding rulings.  If they 
succeed in making their views binding in a de facto sense, they will 
have increased the cost of ignoring these views.  This same reasoning 
also explains why the HRC has urged states to amend the ICCPR’s Op-
tional Protocol to make its views binding.60
III. A THEORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
If international courts are able to alter the incentives of states so 
as to encourage compliance, we would like to identify and model the 
mechanism by which they do so.  In particular, there must be some 
process through which the existence of a tribunal imposes costs on 
violating states.  A desire to avoid these costs provides the incentive to 
comply with international law.61  The analysis that follows examines 
how a typical dispute would be handled by the parties, when formal 
dispute-resolution procedures will be used, and what the potential 
outcomes may be. 
60 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 351-52. 
61 International law also includes some rules that, at least arguably, require states 
to provide compensation to a state that has been wronged.  Even if one accepts that 
such a rule of law exists, there remains the question of why it should affect state behav-
ior.  In trying to understand why a state might comply with an international obligation 
it makes no sense to turn to a rule of international law that says a failure to comply 
generates an obligation to make reparations.  If there is nothing other than the inter-
national law obligation to encourage compliance with the initial obligation, then the 
rule requiring reparations is similarly impotent. 
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As previously mentioned, this Article focuses on mandatory dis-
pute-resolution procedures.  The term “mandatory” refers to a process 
that gives the would-be complaining party, C, the option of pursuing a 
dispute through a legalized process.  If C opts for this process the de-
fendant, D, cannot prevent the case from moving forward.  A manda-
tory process does not, however, prevent C from pursuing other strate-
gies for resolving the dispute.  In particular the alternative of pursuing 
the dispute through regular political means remains available.62
To model this interaction, assume that C has a dispute with D.63  If 
there is no mandatory dispute-resolution system in place, C must pur-
sue the dispute through conventional diplomatic means, which I call 
“politics.”  If, on the other hand, an international tribunal is available, 
C can choose to pursue a remedy through that system, which I call 
“litigation.”64
The term “politics” is used in a nonstandard way here, and so 
clarification is in order.  The key difference between politics and liti-
gation is that politics describes a situation in which threatening litiga-
tion serves no purpose because the parties realize that the threat is ei-
ther not relevant or not credible.  This may be because it is clear that 
C can do at least as well through politics as through litigation, making 
the threat of litigation irrelevant, or because litigating would be too 
costly for the complainant, making the threat of litigation not credi-
ble.  Politics is the complainant’s only option if there are no dispute-
resolution procedures available, and it is an alternative to litigating if 
such procedures are in place. 
Litigation involves taking or threatening, perhaps implicitly, to 
take a case to an international tribunal.  The decision to litigate (i.e., 
to use or threaten to use the dispute-resolution system) clearly does 
not cut off all negotiation, and once C has chosen litigation the parties 
may settle the case.  Here, the term “settle” or “settlement” refers to 
negotiated outcomes prior to a tribunal ruling that occur in the 
62 This Article considers the possibility that a formal dispute-resolution system may 
attempt to make itself the exclusive vehicle for the resolution of disputes.  See infra Part 
IV.F.3. 
63 It is assumed that the parties have full information. 
64 The term “litigation” refers to the use or threatened use of a tribunal.  It does 
not require that the tribunal reach a ruling or even that the complainant file a case at 
the tribunal.  Thus, for example, settlement of a dispute in the face of a threat to file a 
complaint qualifies as litigation for our purposes. 
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shadow of dispute-resolution procedures.65  If the parties fail to settle 
the case they must proceed to a ruling by the tribunal.  The tribunal 
may find that the defendant violated the underlying rule of interna-
tional law, or it may find that the defendant acted within the law.  If 
the defendant is judged to have acted legally, both parties receive a 
payoff of zero.66  If the defendant acted illegally the defendant 
chooses either to comply with the ruling or to ignore it.  Each of these 
options yields payoffs which are described in more detail below. 
Figure 1 provides a representation of the dispute.  The payoffs to 
the parties are listed in the parentheses with the complainant’s payoff 
listed first, followed by the defendant’s.  The meaning of the variables 
listed in Figure 1 and a discussion of how the dispute proceeds are dis-
cussed in Sections III.A and III.B.  The game is examined through 
“backward induction,” the standard mechanism used to solve games of 
this sort.  This simply means that the analysis begins at the final stage 
and works backwards to the first decision point. 
Figure 1:  Dispute-Resolution Payoffs 
( JC
NC, R + JD
NC )
Comply 
No
Violation
Settle
Politic
C
( JC
C, R + JD
C )
(0, 0) 
(PC , PD)
Ignore
Violation
Ruling
Litigate
(SC , SD)
( JC
NC, R + JD
NC )
65 The terms here are used for convenience only.  I mean to suggest neither that 
politics is absent when a threat of litigation exists nor that “law” is absent when there is 
no dispute resolution. 
66 Assigning a payoff of zero to this outcome is simply a way of establishing a base-
line against which to measure other outcomes.  All the analysis that follows remains 
valid even if a ruling for the defendant leaves the parties in a different position than 
they would have been had the case never been filed. 
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A.  Politics 
In the absence of international adjudication, or if C chooses to use 
politics rather than litigation, C pursues its dispute with D by threaten-
ing some form of retaliation (e.g., trade sanctions, withdrawal of aid, 
etc.) threatening to resist cooperation in the future, threatening to 
announce the violation to the world, or threatening to impose a cost 
on D in some other way (or actually imposing such a cost).  D can re-
spond with stonewalling, counter-threats, capitulation, or some com-
bination of these.  This is simply the familiar back-and-forth of inter-
national relations, the precise form of which is not critical for our 
purposes.  One way or another, the dispute is resolved—though not 
necessarily quickly and not necessarily amicably—through this politi-
cal process, and each state receives a payoff that reflects the gain or 
loss it experienced as a result of the dispute.  The payoffs may be af-
fected by any number of factors, including the legal rule at issue, the 
relative power of the parties, other interactions they may have with 
one another, and so on.  The key point here is that the payoffs are 
unaffected by the presence of an international tribunal.  The payoffs 
from politics will be labeled PC and PD for the complainant and defen-
dant, respectively.67
B.  Litigation 
If an international tribunal is available, the complainant can 
choose to pursue litigation rather than politics.  For convenience, it is 
assumed that litigation costs are zero.68
If C files a complaint with the tribunal and the case proceeds to 
judgment, the tribunal announces whether D has violated a rule of in-
ternational law.  The tribunal may also state what a losing defendant 
67 The payoff for the defendant is defined in such a way that PD > 0 when politics 
imposes a cost on the defendant. 
68 Though this assumption is made to simplify the presentation, it may also be a 
good approximation of reality.  The funds necessary to support litigation will typically 
be taken from the state’s general treasury, and so their use is unlikely to be politically 
controversial.  Furthermore, for many disputes states can staff all or much of the litiga-
tion team with individuals already on the government payroll.  Though use of these 
“in-house” lawyers and negotiators implies some opportunity cost—they are taken away 
from other tasks—it is likely to be less expensive than hiring private counsel to pursue 
the case.  Notice also that for most states the dollar cost of litigation, even if it reaches 
several million dollars, will represent a negligible fraction of government spending.  
Finally, even if there are costs associated with litigation, they are relevant only to the 
extent that they are greater than the costs of politics. 
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must do to cure the violation.  This might be an order to bring itself 
into compliance with its international obligations, an order to provide 
some form of compensation, or some other sanction. 
The ruling itself is, of course, simply words on a page and comes 
with no coercive enforcement.  Because it is an authoritative and pub-
lic judgment, however, the ruling provides information both to the 
parties and to other states.  If D is judged to have violated interna-
tional law, it may suffer reputational sanctions.69  The winning party 
or, conceivably, third parties, may also respond by suspending compli-
ance with the relevant agreement or retaliating against the losing 
party.  These actions in response to the ruling impose a cost labeled R,
R > 0.70  In response to the ruling, D can either comply or ignore the 
tribunal.  The defendant’s cost of complying is labeled JD
C and the re-
sulting gain to the complainant is JC
C.71
There remains the question of why D would comply with the 
judgment of the tribunal.  There are certainly cases in which a state 
refuses to comply with the rulings of tribunals.  In 2004, for example, 
the ICJ ruled in the Avena case72 that the failure of the United States 
to inform defendants of their rights under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations73 required a remedy that “guarantees that full 
weight be given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna 
Convention.”74  Despite the fact that the defendants had failed to raise 
the denial of their Vienna Convention rights early in their domestic 
court proceedings, the ICJ ruled that American procedural-default 
rules could not be applied and that American courts were obliged to 
provide a substantive review of the Vienna Convention claims to de-
termine if actual prejudice had resulted.75
The United States responded to this ICJ decision in the form of a 
United States Supreme Court ruling—Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.76  In 
that case, the Supreme Court concluded that under United States law, 
69 See Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 4, at 1861-65 (discussing the 
impact of a violation of international law on a state’s reputation). 
70 Because C already knows that D has violated the law, it is assumed that C enjoys 
no gain from the ruling itself.  This assumption—that C enjoys no gain from the ruling 
itself—simplifies the presentation but is not required for any of the results. 
71 Superscripts refer to whether or not there has been compliance, and subscripts 
identify the party as the defendant or complainant. 
72 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
73 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Mar. 19, 1967, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
74 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 139. 
75 Id. at ¶  121. 
76 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
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“claims under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may be subjected 
to the same procedural default rules that apply generally to other fed-
eral-law claims.”77  With this ruling, the Supreme Court made clear 
that the United States was going to ignore the Avena ruling as it ap-
plies to procedural default. 
Though additional examples of states ignoring the rulings of in-
ternational tribunals could be cited, it is also clear that in many other 
cases the losing party chooses to comply.78  The ICJ, for example, has 
successfully resolved a number of border disputes.79  One of these in-
volved a dispute between Botswana and Namibia over the Ka-
sikil/Sedudu Island in the Chobe River.  The parties agreed to submit 
the dispute to the ICJ in 1999.  The court awarded the island to Bot-
swana but gave both countries rights in the channel on either side of 
the island.80  The Namibian government publicly accepted the ruling, 
and the two states established a technical commission to officially de-
marcate the entire length of the Chobe.  This work was successfully 
completed in 2003. 
Similarly, compliance levels at the WTO—where, it should be 
added, there is at least the potential for trade sanctions if a state fails 
to comply—appear to be fairly high.81  More generally, casual observa-
tion suggests that states often comply with the rulings of international 
tribunals.82
77 Id. at 360. 
78 For a more thorough discussion of compliance with the ICJ, see Jonathan I. 
Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court:  Problems of Non-
Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 288 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987), which analyzes ICJ 
cases prior to 1987.  See also Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the Inter-
national Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 434 (2004) (discussing compliance 
from 1987 to 2004). 
79 See Paulson, supra note 78, at 458 tbl.1 (finding that, of eight border disputes 
within the period of study, the compliance level was “high” in five of them and “me-
dium” in the remaining three). 
80 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1108 (Dec. 13). 
81 See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that 
legal scholars have observed a “high rate of compliance”); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 
O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade 
Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S196-98 (2002) (arguing that reputation plays a 
critical role in enforcing WTO rules). 
82 See, for example, Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the Recom-
mendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 5-7 (2007), which concluded that of forty-four cases handled by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, six (14%) led to full compliance, four-
teen (32%) led to partial compliance, and thirteen cases (30%) led to noncompliance.  
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A rational state will only comply with a ruling if doing so offers a 
higher payoff than the alternative of refusing to comply.  How could 
costly compliance lead to a higher payoff than simply ignoring the rul-
ing?  The answer is that ignoring the ruling imposes its own costs.  Just 
as there are reputational and other costs associated with violating in-
ternational law, there are reputational and other costs associated with 
refusing to honor the rulings of a dispute-resolution system to which a 
state has committed.  The intransigent state is seen as one that is un-
willing to work within the relevant institution, and, in response, other 
states will be reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements with the 
renegade state.83  The state may also be perceived as one that cannot 
be relied upon to keep its legal promises—in this case the promise to 
abide by the tribunal’s rulings.  Should the noncompliant state find 
itself as a winning complainant in a future case, the losing party may 
refuse to comply on reciprocity grounds.  Finally, the winning com-
plainant may retaliate against the noncompliant state.  These costs as-
sociated with a refusal to comply with a ruling are labeled JD
NC and rep-
resent a sanction over and above the cost of losing the case.  As an 
illustration, consider the EC—Hormones case at the WTO.84  Losing 
this case imposed some cost on Europe.  That Europe has refused to 
comply with the rulings of the WTO’s Appellate Body has imposed 
additional costs.85
It is now possible to make some observations about when a losing 
defendant will comply with the ruling of a tribunal.  A losing defen-
dant must bear the cost, R, whether or not it complies with the ruling.  
The decision to comply imposes an additional cost of JD
C, while a re-
fusal to comply imposes an additional cost of JD
N C. 86
The remaining eleven cases either featured compliance as a result of regime change—
and, therefore, not as a result of the tribunal’s decision—or were unclear cases.  Of the 
cases for which compliance could be measured and attributed to success or failure by 
the tribunal, 18% yielded full compliance, 42% partial compliance, and 39% noncom-
pliance.
83 For a detailed discussion of how a state’s reputation for compliance with inter-
national law is related to its behavior, see GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS,
supra note 4, at 71-117. 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. 
85 Those additional costs include trade measures put in place by the United States 
and Canada.  In this and other cases there may also be reputational damage or other 
costs.
86 One could collapse the cost of losing the case and the cost of complying or ig-
noring the tribunal into a single variable that would measure the cost to the losing 
party of complying or ignoring the tribunal.  Leaving these variables disaggregated, 
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D will comply with the tribunal only if the cost of noncompliance 
exceeds the cost of compliance: JD
NC > JD
C.  If D loses the case and pre-
fers to comply with the ruling, the complainant receives the benefit of 
D’s compliance while the defendant bears the costs of losing the case 
and the cost of compliance.87  Formally this can be represented as: 
C receives : JC
C
 If JD
NC  JD
C
D loses:  R + JD
C
If D loses but chooses not to comply the payoffs can be represented as: 
C receives:  JC
NC
 If JD
NC < JD
C
D loses:  R + JD
NC
JC
NC represents the payoff to the complainant following the defen-
dant’s failure to comply with the ruling.  JC
NC could be as small as zero 
if the complainant has no alternative avenues through which to seek 
relief.  Alternatively it may be larger—perhaps even larger than what 
the complainant could get through politics, PC, because the victory be-
fore the tribunal may give the complainant greater leverage over the 
defendant. 
C.  Settlement 
If the complainant elects to pursue litigation, the parties may re-
solve their dispute through negotiation prior to the tribunal’s ruling.  
Here, the term “settlement” refers to negotiated outcomes reached in 
the shadow of a tribunal. 
A settlement requires the consent of both parties and so must be 
preferred by both parties over the alternative of a judgment.  The par-
ties are in full control of the terms of the settlement and so virtually 
any arrangement is possible as long as both states agree.  The ques-
tion, then, is whether there is some feasible agreement that makes 
both parties better off than if they wait for a ruling.  Settlements can 
take the form of cash payments, cessation of particular conduct, con-
however, proves convenient for some of the discussion that follows.  Nothing in the 
analysis turns on whether these costs are lumped together or included separately. 
87 Recall that if D wins the case, both parties receive a payoff of zero. 
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cessions in unrelated areas, and so on.  When states settle a dispute, 
the cost to one side may not be the same as the gain to the other.  
This is so both because international settlements typically do not con-
sist of (exclusively) cash payments from one side to the other, and be-
cause the relevant payoffs are the political payoffs to political leaders.  
We therefore allow the payoffs between the parties to be asymmetric, and 
label them SD and SC, for the defendant and complainant, respectively. 
To evaluate the parties’ decision making with respect to settle-
ment we must once again distinguish between situations in which the 
defendant would ignore a ruling, should one be issued, and situations 
where the defendant would comply with such a ruling.  Consider first 
the situation where the defendant would ignore the tribunal’s rul-
ing—that is, if JD
NC < JD
C.  In that case the defendant prefers a settle-
ment, SD, if the cost of settlement is less than the reputational costs of 
losing before the tribunal and ignoring its judgment.  So D prefers set-
tlement if and only if SD < R + JD
NC.  The complainant stands to receive 
JC
NC if the case goes to judgment—because the defendant will ignore 
the ruling—and so will prefer any settlement that results in SC > JC
NC.
So if JD
NC < JD
C
, the parties reach a settlement if there exists some 
settlement for which SD R + JD
NC and SC JC
NC.  To simplify: 
SD – R – JD
NC 0 and SC - JC
NC  0          [1]. 
Now consider the situation if the defendant would comply with 
the tribunal’s ruling, should one be issued—that is, JD
NC > JD
C.  The de-
fendant will accept a settlement if its costs are less than the reputa-
tional and other costs of the ruling itself plus the cost of compliance—
R + JD
C.  In other words, D prefers settlement if and only if SD < R + JD
C.
The complainant will only agree to a settlement that yields a pay-
off greater than JC
C, that which it stands to gain from the defendant’s 
compliance with the judgment.  So the complainant will agree to a set-
tlement if and only if SC > JC
C.
Summarizing these results, if JD
NC > JD
C , the parties will reach a set-
tlement if there exists some settlement for which SD R + JD
C and SC JC
C.
To simplify: 
SD – R – JD
C  0 and SC – JC
C  0          [2]. 
Table I summarizes the conditions under which there will be settlement.  
2008] International Tribunals 201
Table 1:  Summary of Settlement Conditions 
JD
NC < JD
C
           (D would ignore  
            ruling)
JD
NC > JD
C
(D would comply 
with ruling)
C agrees to settle if: SC – JC
NC  0. SC – JC
C  0. 
D agrees to settle if: SD – R – JD
NC  0 SD – R – JD
C  0 
Notice that for some values of the relevant variables, the parties 
will proceed to a judgment rather than settle.  In contrast to standard 
models of domestic litigation, the parties may fail to settle even if they 
know all relevant payoffs and the probability of victory for each party.  
Two features of the model explain the failure to settle.  First, the pay-
offs are political, so a given outcome may yield different payoffs if it is 
the result of a tribunal ruling rather than a settlement.  Thus a party 
may prefer a ruling even if a settlement is possible on the same terms.  
Second, the payoffs are asymmetric—the gains or losses to one party 
may be larger or smaller than the gains or losses to the other.  When 
combined with political payoffs it is possible for the parties to be bet-
ter off with a ruling than with a settlement.88
D.  Politics and Litigation 
The last step in evaluating the choices of the parties is to address 
the complainant’s choice between politics and litigation.  As already 
discussed,89 the difference between these two alternatives is that the 
former is unaffected by the presence of a tribunal. 
88 See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 
VA. L. REV. 251, 252 (2006) (asserting that a ruling by a trade court “actually increases
the President’s power over lawmaking at home”). 
89 See supra Part III.A-B. 
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To analyze the decision between politics and litigation we once 
again consider whether or not D would comply with a tribunal’s rul-
ing.  Because the parties know the payoffs and probability of victory 
for each party, they are able to anticipate the settlement negotiations 
and so can predict the settlement terms, SC and SD.
90  Suppose first that 
D would comply with a tribunal’s ruling (JD
NC > JD
C).  Knowing this, C
chooses between the larger of (i) the payoff from politics (PC) and (ii) 
the payoff from settlement (if a settlement is possible) or judgment (if 
no settlement is possible). 
In formal notation, C receives Max {PC, SC} if there exists a settle-
ment arrangement {SC, SD} such that: 
SC – JC
C  0 and SD – R – JD
C  0          [3]  
 or Max {PC, JC} if there is no such settlement arrangement.
91
If [3] is satisfied, D gets either PD or SD, depending on whether C set-
tles or politics.  If not, D gets PD or R + JD
C.
Now suppose the defendant will not comply with a ruling should 
one be issued.  The complainant can politic and earn PC, or it can seek 
to negotiate a settlement backed by the threat of litigation.  Formally, 
C receives Max {PC, SC} if there exists a settlement arrangement {SC, SD}
such that: 
SC – JC
NC  0 and SD – R – JD
NC  0          [4]  
or Max {PC, JC} if there is no such settlement arrangement.
92
If [4] is satisfied the defendant gets either PD or SD depending on 
whether C settles or politics.  If not, D gets PD or R + JD
NC.
These theoretical results allow us to consider how alternative 
forms of international tribunals will behave.  More specifically, we can 
ask what will happen if, for example, one of the above variables is 
changed as a result of a change in the tribunal structure.  That is the 
task of the next section. 
90 When the tribunal speaks, of course, it provides additional information about 
the facts and the law. 
91 Stated another way, C receives Max {PC , JC } if, for all available settlement possi-
bilities, either SC – J
C  < 0 or SD – R – JD
C > 0. 
92 Stated another way, C receives Max {PC , SC } if, for all available settlement possi-
bilities, either SC – JC
NC < 0 or SD – R – JD
NC > 0. 
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS AND THE DESIGN OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
When states create an international tribunal they have almost 
complete freedom over its design.  A glance at existing tribunals dem-
onstrates that states have taken advantage of this flexibility and struc-
tured tribunals in different ways.  The WTO dispute-resolution system, 
for example, is mandatory, provides for sanctions in the event of a 
failure to comply with a ruling, provides a standing body of highly in-
dependent judges (at the appellate level) and issues binding deci-
sions.93  The jurisdiction of the ICJ, on the other hand, is subject to 
the consent of the parties, which can be given ahead of time; the 
Court has no system for imposing sanctions on violators and no 
mechanism for appellate review.94  The HRC is charged with accepting 
reports from states in a non-adversarial process and, if states consent, 
to consider interstate claims about violations of the ICCPR.  In either 
case, the HRC issues reports that are not binding on the parties.95
Why might rational states select one set of features rather than 
another?  Why have they selected different features in different tribu-
nals?  Part IV.A explains how the various design choices made in the 
creation of a tribunal impact the three key variables in the above 
model:  (i) the cost of being judged to be in violation (R); (ii) the 
costs of ignoring a tribunal’s ruling ( JD
NC); and (iii) the cost of com-
pliance with a ruling ( JD
C).  Once this is done, alternative design 
choices are analyzed in terms of how they affect these three variables. 
A.  Tribunal Design and Effectiveness 
Tribunal design can influence outcomes by affecting one or more 
of the three above-mentioned variables.  Understanding the relation-
ship between a particular design choice and the relevant variables is 
the key to understanding how effectiveness is impacted. 
First, a particular design choice may affect the reputational or 
other costs of being found to have violated international law, R.96
When this cost increases, so does the tribunal’s effectiveness. 
93 DSU, supra note 18. 
94 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 36. 
95 See ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 40. 
96 Greater independence and quality raise this cost.  Transparency in voting within 
the tribunal can also increase quality—among other effects—and, therefore, may in-
crease this cost. 
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Second, changes to the tribunal may alter the costs borne by a los-
ing defendant that chooses to ignore the tribunal, JD
N C. 97  An increase 
in the cost of ignoring the tribunal raises the expected cost of violat-
ing the law and, in turn, leads to an increase in the tribunal’s effec-
tiveness.  Such a cost may cause a state that would otherwise have ig-
nored the tribunal to comply with the ruling, but this also increases 
the defendant’s costs and so increases the tribunal’s effectiveness. 
Third, changes to a tribunal may affect the cost borne by a defen-
dant that complies with a ruling, JD
C. 98  Changes to this cost have a 
more nuanced impact on effectiveness.  For states that will comply 
with the ruling, an increase in this cost clearly increases that effective-
ness of the tribunal as it raises the expected cost of the underlying vio-
lation.  For states that would ignore the tribunals with or without the 
change, an increase in the cost of complying with the ruling has no 
impact.  This leaves a third group of states that would comply with the 
ruling but for the increase in the cost of doing so.  That is, increasing 
the cost of complying with the tribunal causes these states to refuse to 
comply.  This impacts effectiveness in two ways.  First, it increases the 
cost of the underlying violation because the losing defendant bears 
higher costs than it would have absent the change.  This tends to in-
crease the effectiveness of the tribunal.  But pushing states toward 
noncompliance with the tribunal has an additional effect because it 
alters the payoff to the complainant in the event of a judgment.  
Rather than receiving JC
C (the complainant’s payoff when the defen-
dant complies with the tribunal) the complainant receives JC
NC (the 
payoff if the defendant fails to comply with the tribunal).  If JC
NC is less 
than JC, as is likely, the complainant’s incentive to bring the case in the 
first place is reduced and its threat to do so is less credible.  If this ef-
fect is strong enough (e.g., if JC
N C = 0), the complainant may prefer not 
to pursue litigation at all.  Knowing this, the defendant will refuse to 
settle for anything greater than the payoff from politics, PD, and the 
tribunal will lose effectiveness.  If JC
NC is similar in magnitude to JC, on 
the other hand, increasing the cost of complying with the ruling will 
increase effectiveness. 
Finally, there are design issues that the model does not capture—
at least not as it is presented above.  These choices can, however, be 
assessed using an extension of the above model, and section IV.F con-
siders three such features:  whether there is a mandatory consultation 
97 Greater independence and quality also increase this cost. 
98 Imposition of remedies by a tribunal, for example, increases this cost. 
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period, whether jurisdiction is compulsory, and whether the tribunal 
attempts to constrain politics. 
B.  How and Why Does Quality Matter? 
It almost goes without saying that is preferable to staff a tribunal 
with judges of higher rather than lower quality.  Helfer and Slaughter 
suggest that the key dimension along which quality matters is that the 
members of a tribunal be “known and respected by national judges.”99
They reach this conclusion because they believe that the key mecha-
nism through which international tribunals are made effective is the 
domestic court system.100  If domestic judges respect the international 
judges there will be greater deference to the decisions of international 
tribunals.  Indeed, Helfer and Slaughter suggest that expertise in in-
ternational law may be less important than expertise in domestic law 
because it is the latter that makes a judge well-known among national 
judges.101
Whether or not Helfer and Slaughter are correct, their claim 
makes clear that a simple reference to quality is not enough.  Rather, 
we must have some understanding of what “quality” means—i.e., what 
features of a judge or tribunal increase the impact of a ruling? 
Because a tribunal’s role is simply to provide information about 
the facts and the law, an increase in quality necessarily means an in-
crease (or at least a perceived increase) in the quality of the informa-
tion provided.  So to the extent that a change in the tribunal makes 
that information more accurate and reliable, the change can be de-
scribed as an increase in quality. 
This analysis corresponds to standard notions of what it means to 
appoint a “better” judge.  A better judge produces higher quality deci-
sions—decisions that are more likely to reach accurate conclusions 
with respect to the facts and the law.102  Because the information is 
99 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 300. 
100 See id. at 290 (“In sum, we measure the effectiveness of a supranational tribunal 
in terms of its ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic 
government institutions . . . to use their power on its behalf.”). 
101 See id. at 300 (noting that “staffing an international tribunal solely with experts 
in international law” may lead to members being “less well-known to national judges 
than appointees of equal distinction who have made a career in domestic law”).  One 
relevant question that could be raised is whether a judge known within the domestic 
law of one country is likely to be known among other states party to the litigation. 
102 In some instances, of course, there may be no single “accurate” interpretation 
of the law.  The language in a treaty, for example, may be vague, and the parties may 
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more reliable, states will, for example, adjust their estimate of the los-
ing defendant’s reputation more readily.  If it is likely that the court 
has made a mistake, on the other hand, the reputational consequence 
will be less severe.103
States react to the ruling of a tribunal based on their beliefs about 
the quality of that ruling, and so it is the perception of a judge’s (and 
therefore a tribunal’s) abilities that matters rather than the actual 
quality.  There is, of course, a close relationship between perceived 
and actual quality in a rational-choice model such as the one used 
here.  Over time we expect observers to adjust their perception of 
quality in reaction to the decisions they see, and we expect this 
movement to align perceptions about quality more closely with actual 
quality.
In the domestic court system, with its larger case volume, the abil-
ity of observers to update their beliefs about the quality of judges 
makes it less important to appoint individuals who are respected for 
their judicial abilities prior to appointment.  In addition, the coercive 
enforcement system of the courts ensures that the decisions of judges 
will be rendered effective.104
International tribunals, however, have different characteristics 
and different needs.  First, because most such tribunals hear relatively 
few cases, judges have a limited ability to acquire or alter a reputa-
tion.105  A judge’s reputation upon appointment, therefore, will con-
tinue to have a large effect on how her rulings are perceived for quite 
some time.  This suggests that appointing respected jurists is more 
important, all else equal, for international courts than for domestic 
courts.  In practice this may provide a reason to appoint judges to in-
have entered into the agreement with divergent understandings of that language or 
without any particular understanding of it.  In this case, higher quality decisions will be 
those that are more reasonable given the background legal landscape and that more 
accurately reflect what the parties would have agreed to if they had negotiated over the 
matter.  This concept is similar to what Helfer and Slaughter call “quality of legal rea-
soning.” Id. at 318. 
103 For example, if a tribunal’s decision is thought to be no more accurate than a 
fully random assignment of responsibility (i.e., the tribunal has a fifty-percent chance 
of being right and a fifty-percent chance of being wrong with its ruling on the question 
of whether or not there has been a violation), then observing states do not gain any 
information from the ruling and will not update their beliefs about the allegedly violat-
ing state or alter their behavior with respect to retaliation and reciprocity. 
104 To be sure, the court system as a whole benefits if its judges are respected, and 
that respect presumably comes with a belief that they are of high quality. 
105 This ability is further hampered if the tribunal does not reveal the author of 
decisions and does not permit a judge to dissent from a decision.  See infra Part IV.E. 
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ternational tribunals who are, on average, more senior and estab-
lished than newly appointed domestic judges. 
If a tribunal exceeds the authority that it is granted and embarks 
on policy-making adventures, the effect is similar to a loss of quality.  
Like a low-quality tribunal, a maverick tribunal is less likely to provide 
an accurate and unbiased judgment of facts and law.  This does not 
necessarily completely strip such a tribunal of influence, but as the 
judges stray from interpretation of legal rules toward policy making or 
legislating from the bench, their rulings become less credible. 
A focus on the quality of information makes it clear that more 
than just the quality of the judges matters.  Giving a tribunal greater 
resources, permitting it to engage in independent fact finding,106
structuring more effective procedural rules, improving the quality of 
lawyering, and supporting the judges’ work with a capable secretariat 
all represent plausible ways to increase quality. 
In our model, any action to increase the quality of the tribunal 
corresponds to an increase in the cost, R, borne by a losing defen-
dant.  If the tribunal also orders some remedy the cost of ignoring the 
ruling, JD
NC, will increase with the tribunal’s quality. 
As shown in Part IV.A, increases in R and JD
NC improve the effec-
tiveness of the tribunal.  It also makes it more likely that the parties 
will settle the dispute prior to a ruling because the defendant is more 
eager to reach a settlement.107  Furthermore, the complainant will, on 
average, get more from settlement that increases the complainant’s 
incentive to bring the case in the first place and, therefore, provides 
an additional increase in the expected cost of violation.108
Hypothesis:  Increases in the perceived quality of judges or the tribunal 
generate a greater incentive for compliance with the underlying sub-
stantive rules and lead to fewer violations of international law, mak-
ing a tribunal more effective.
Hypothesis:  Increases in perceived quality increase the likelihood of 
settlement, the cost of settlement to the defendant, and the gains from 
settlement enjoyed by the complainant.
106 Helfer and Slaughter identify resources and independent fact finding as two 
stand-alone attributes of effectiveness within their thirteen-factor “checklist.”  Helfer & 
Slaughter, supra note 6, at 301-04. 
107 That is, it makes it more likely that the inequalities that correspond to settle-
ment, SD – R – JD
C < 0 or SD – R – JD
NC < 0, are satisfied. 
108 This is because higher quality increases the cost of losing for the defendant, 
making the defendant more eager to settle and, therefore, willing to pay more to do so. 
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Hypothesis:  Increases in perceived quality make it more likely that a 
losing defendant will comply with the ruling of a tribunal.
C.  Should Tribunals be “Independent”? 
Debates about the effectiveness of international tribunals have fo-
cused to a certain extent on tribunal independence.  Posner and Yoo, 
for example, argue that “independence prevents international tribu-
nals from being effective”109 while Helfer and Slaughter argue that in-
dependence contributes to effectiveness.110  This debate has been sty-
mied by the already discussed lack of clarity regarding the definition 
of effectiveness.  Posner and Yoo focus on the question of whether tri-
bunals carry out the will of states at the time of the dispute while 
Helfer and Slaughter focus on the ability of tribunals to generate 
compliance with their rulings. 
Using the model from Part III and the definitions from Part II, 
this subsection explores the relationship between independence and 
effectiveness, uncovers how the implicit assumptions being made in 
the existing debate generate disagreement, and explains the condi-
tions under which each side’s conclusions are correct or incorrect. 
One of course needs a definition of independence, and an appro-
priate one is provided by Professors Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaugh-
ter, who define it as the “extent to which adjudicators for an interna-
tional authority charged with dispute resolution are able to deliberate 
and reach legal judgments independently of national governments.”111
There is little serious disagreement about how to increase a tribunal’s 
independence.112  All commentators agree that rules governing selec-
109 Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 7. 
110 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 312-14. 
111 Robert O. Keohane et al., supra note 56,  at 457, 459-60 (2000). 
112 In an attempt to operationalize independence, Posner and Yoo identify five 
characteristics that they argue correspond to independence:  (i) compulsory jurisdic-
tion; (ii) no right to a judge being a national; (iii) permanent body; (iv) judges having 
fixed terms; and (v) the right of third parties to intervene.  Posner & Yoo, supra note 
45, at 51.  One could quibble with this list, but for present purposes these factors offer 
a useful illustration of what might contribute to the independence of judges.  Posner 
and Yoo construct a measure of independence by assigning a tribunal one point for 
each of the characteristics that the tribunal has.  I leave to the side the important ques-
tion of whether that measure is a good one for empirical purposes.  One could obvi-
ously imagine any number of alternatives, including a different list of factors and dif-
ferent weighting of them. 
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tion and tenure,113 financial and human resources, and perhaps even 
the trappings of the institution and the judicial role are relevant.114
The traditional view of international law scholars is that more in-
dependent tribunals have greater legitimacy and are more effective 
for this reason.115  This claim, however, needs elaboration if it is to be 
viewed as a satisfactory account of international courts.  It requires, for 
example, a definition of legitimacy and an explanation of why legiti-
macy increases effectiveness. 
Because our model of international tribunals relies on their in-
formational impact, differences between more and less independent 
tribunals must turn on their relative abilities to provide information.  
The connection between independence and information is clear:  
greater independence makes individual judges or arbitrators more 
neutral and their decisions less biased.  Put another way, as tribunals 
become more dependent, it is more likely that a ruling is the product 
of political forces rather than a judgment about the relevant legal 
rules and their application to the facts. 
At first glance, then, greater independence has the same effect as 
higher quality (discussed above in section IV.B).  To the extent that a 
tribunal is perceived to be more independent, the costs of losing a 
case or of ignoring the ruling are increased and so is the effectiveness 
of the tribunal. 
There is, however, at least one important way in which independ-
ence affects tribunals differently than does an increase in quality.  In-
creases in quality will not generally affect the cost of compliance with 
a tribunal’s ruling ( JD
C) because the action that a losing defendant 
must take to comply with the ruling will be the same regardless of the 
quality of the tribunal (given that the defendant has lost). 
113 Id.  The more dependent judges are on national governments for either their 
current or future careers, the more closely judges (or their views) are associated with the 
government at the time of appointment, the more control governments have over their 
appointment, and the shorter their tenure, the less independent they are likely to be. 
114 Id.  Judges and tribunals with more resources are better able to process cases 
quickly and effectively and are likely to render higher-quality decisions, all else equal.  
Such resources may also allow a tribunal to conduct independent fact finding, which 
gives it a greater ability to make decisions without reliance on the parties. 
115 See Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-Madisonian Global Constitutionalism:  Thomas M. 
Franck’s Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing Diversity and World Order in the 
Twenty-First Century, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291, 296 (2003) (“[T]he effectiveness 
and legitimacy constraints of [the tribunals’] operation . . . require a highly variegated 
theory as to the proper roles and future aspirations of differently situated tribunals.”). 
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Changes to the independence of the tribunal, on the other hand, 
affect the cost of complying with a ruling.  To the extent that a defen-
dant has influence over the tribunal it will seek to avoid being found 
to have violated international law but, should it be found to have done 
so, it will also seek to reduce the cost of complying with the ruling.  A 
complainant will, of course, have opposing incentives. 
A rational complainant, however, will not want to make compli-
ance with the ruling so expensive as to cause the defendant to ignore 
the ruling.  That outcome would normally reduce the payoff to the 
complainant relative to one in which the defendant complies. 
With a more dependant tribunal, then, the probability of non-
compliance by the defendant is reduced.  This is important because 
the complainant’s incentive to file a complaint is reduced, all else 
equal, if the defendant refuses to comply. 
Posner and Yoo make essentially this point when they argue that 
independence undermines effectiveness because “independent tribu-
nals . . . can render decisions that conflict with the interests of state 
parties.”116  This claim cannot really mean that the ruling makes both 
states worse off since the states can always reach some alternative set-
tlement if they wish.  The authors must mean that the tribunal may is-
sue a ruling that imposes costs on one state that exceed the benefits to 
the other and there must be something to prevent the states from ne-
gotiating a preferable outcome.  This appears to be what Posner and 
Yoo have in mind: 
[Tribunals] cannot issue judgments that run contrary to the interests of 
the parties to a dispute.  If they do so, their rulings will be ignored and 
states will use them less often.  And therein lies the problem.  More in-
dependent tribunals are less likely to issue decisions that are satisfactory 
to all state parties to a dispute.  So making a tribunal independent may 
actually undermine its effectiveness.
117
The problem with this argument, as already discussed, is that sim-
ply ignoring a ruling imposes its own costs.  It is true that an inde-
pendent tribunal is more likely to demand actions that the defendant 
is unwilling to take.  In that case the defendant refuses to comply and 
the parties get the corresponding payoffs.  Contrary to what Posner 
and Yoo claim, however, this does not undermine effectiveness.  A de-
pendent tribunal generates compliance by reducing the cost of com-
pliance to the point where it is less than the cost of noncompliance.  
116 Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 7. 
117 Id. at 28. 
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This compliance reduces the sanctions imposed on the defendant for 
its violation of international law, and therefore, reduces the effec-
tiveness of the tribunal.  A dependent tribunal, therefore, may get a 
higher rate of compliance with its rulings, but only by reducing its 
effectiveness. 
There remains only one way in which independence could reduce 
effectiveness.  If an independent tribunal demands so much from the 
defendant that the defendant refuses compliance, the complainant’s 
payoff is likely to be reduced.  If this reduction in the complainant’s 
payoff is large enough, it could reduce the incentive to bring the case 
in the first place and, therefore, reduce the defendant’s expected cost 
of violating the relevant rule.  This outcome, however, seems unlikely.  
It requires, first, a large difference between the complainant’s payoffs 
when the defendant complies as opposed to when the defendant re-
fuses to comply.  More importantly, it assumes that the parties will be 
unable to negotiate around this situation.  Once the tribunal rules, 
the defendant wants to reduce the costs it bears while the complainant 
wants to extract the largest possible gains for itself.  One option for 
the parties is to agree on some partial compliance by the defendant.  
As long as this gives both parties a payoff greater than noncompliance, 
the case will be resolved.  Furthermore, this result can be achieved 
with minimal transaction costs.  The losing defendant can unilaterally 
determine the actions that it will take.  As long as the complainant 
prefers that outcome to explicit noncompliance by the defendant, the 
complainant will acquiesce to the arrangement.  In effect, the defen-
dant makes a “take it or leave it” offer and can adjust the offer to en-
sure that the complainant accepts. 
Because the parties can engage in this sort of settlement after the 
ruling, it is unlikely that an independent tribunal will undermine the 
complainant’s incentive to bring the complaint in the first place. 
Overall, then, an increase in independence has several effects.  It 
increases the cost of ignoring a tribunal’s ruling, it increases the repu-
tational cost to the defendant of losing a case, and it increases the ex-
pected cost of complying with a ruling.  In our model this corresponds 
to increases in R, JD
NC, and JD
C.  All of these changes increase the ex-
pected cost borne by a violating defendant and therefore increase the 
effectiveness of the tribunal.118
118 It follows that a rational defendant will be prepared to offer more generous 
settlement terms in order to avoid a ruling, expanding the set of possible settlements, 
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Notice that if the tribunal is more effective, we expect fewer viola-
tions, but where there is a violation, there is a greater chance that liti-
gation will be pursued.  And, if litigation is pursued, there is a greater 
chance of settlement.  Without additional information about the rela-
tive size of these effects, it is simply not possible to generate any pre-
diction about the impact of increased independence on the number 
of cases that result in litigation, the number of cases actually filed 
through a formal dispute settlement system,119 or the share of filed 
cases that generate a ruling. 
It is possible, however, to make a prediction about the impact of 
independence on the rate of compliance with tribunal rulings.  As a 
tribunal becomes more dependent, its procedures become more like 
negotiation and less like adjudication.  The parties to a case have 
more influence if the tribunal is dependent, meaning that they have a 
greater ability to prevent a ruling that they dislike.  The most extreme 
form of dependence, of course, would be a situation where a ruling 
will only be issued if both parties support it.  We can label such an in-
stitution a tribunal, but we more commonly refer to it as a negotia-
tion.120  If both parties have to consent to a decision, of course, it is 
likely to lead to a high level of compliance.  The obvious point is that 
the more the interaction of the parties resembles negotiation, the 
higher the compliance rate one would expect, all else equal. 
This discussion of independence explains a great deal of the de-
bate between Posner and Yoo on the one hand and Helfer and 
Slaughter on the other.  Posner and Yoo are concerned about tribunal 
rulings that are contrary to some measure of the interests of the par-
ties at the time of the dispute, and they point to a low level of compli-
ance with independent tribunals as evidence.121  Theory predicts what 
they claim to observe in the data:  independence reduces compliance 
with tribunal rulings.122  But theory also makes it clear that this has 
nothing to do with effectiveness. 
leading to an increase in the number of settlements, and increasing the expected gains 
to the complainant from settlements. 
119 Because they can threaten to file a complaint with a dispute settlement body, 
states can pursue “litigation” without actually filing a case.  The threat to file may itself 
encourage settlement because, for example, a filing may make a dispute public. 
120 Keohane et al., supra note 56, at 477-78, describe a similar continuum from 
pure control by states (highly dependent) to highly independent tribunals. 
121 See Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 53 tbl.7 (presenting the usage and compli-
ance rates of various courts). 
122 Helfer and Slaughter dispute the empirical claim that increased independence 
reduces compliance with the tribunal.  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 919-22 
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Helfer and Slaughter argue, among other things, that “agreeing to 
an independent tribunal signals the depth of a state’s commitment to 
a particular international regime in a way that makes it more likely 
that it will secure benefits of that regime.”123  This claim is generally 
supported by the analysis developed above.  By increasing the cost of 
ignoring a tribunal, independence generates a stronger incentive for 
states to comply with the underlying legal rule.  In this sense inde-
pendence makes the substantive commitment more credible.124
The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses, all of 
which rely on the assumption that independence does not increase 
the cost of compliance with the tribunal enough to undermine the 
credibility of the complainant’s threat to litigate. 
Hypothesis: More independent tribunals are more effective.
Hypothesis:  Parties in litigation are more likely to settle their dispute 
prior to a ruling if the tribunal is more independent.  The result of 
such settlements will be more favorable to the complainant.
Hypothesis:  A more independent tribunal increases the likelihood that 
the complainant will resort to litigation (rather than politics) in re-
sponse to a violation by the defendant.
D.  Should Tribunals Be Authorized To Impose Remedies? 
The above discussion of independence also helps clarify the role 
of remedies imposed by a tribunal.  I define “remedies” here to be 
some form of compensatory action that must be taken by the losing 
defendant, beyond simply terminating its own violative conduct, to 
(asserting that Posner and Yoo’s comparisons are overly general and statistically ques-
tionable).  I take no position on this empirical question since, to me, it seems unre-
lated to effectiveness. 
123 Id. at 955. 
124 Part of this debate is definitional, and Posner and Yoo are not entirely clear 
about how they define effectiveness.  At one point they suggest that the problem with 
independent tribunals is that “states will be reluctant to use international tribunals 
unless they have control over the judges.”  Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 7.  Posner 
and Yoo’s discussion, however, centers on rates of compliance with rulings, usage rates, 
and “the overall success of the treaty regime,” id. at 29, none of which speak to the will-
ingness of states to accept the jurisdiction to begin with.  The degree of compliance 
with rulings is, of course, consistent with the one used by Slaughter and Helfer.  On 
this definition it seems likely that Yoo and Posner have the better argument for reasons 
stated in the text.  The difficulty, of course, is that compliance with the rulings of tri-
bunals tells us nothing about the impact of the tribunals on compliance with the rele-
vant substantive rule of international law. 
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make amends for its breach of international legal obligations.  Arbi-
tration of an investor-state dispute involving a bilateral investment 
treaty, for example, might lead to a ruling requiring the state to pay 
monetary damages to the investor.125
Many tribunals do not go beyond ruling on the question of 
whether there has been a violation.  An ongoing violation normally 
carries with it an obligation (explicit or implicit) for the losing defen-
dant to cease its violative conduct.  Where the violation is not ongo-
ing, the ruling imposes no obligation at all on the losing defendant.  
At the WTO, for instance, a losing party is expected to bring itself into 
compliance, but no compensation is provided to the complainant.126
In a domestic context, the need for sanctions is well established.  
An efficient deterrent requires that the expected costs of violating the 
law be equal to the expected harm from that violation.  A policy de-
signed in this way discourages all socially harmful violations while al-
lowing violations where societal gains outweigh societal losses.  The 
same logic applies in the international arena.  Ideally one would like a 
system of sanctions to deter all violations in which global costs exceed 
global benefits.  As far as I know there is a consensus that existing en-
forcement tools fall far short of this ideal in virtually every area of in-
ternational law.  Even at the WTO—arguably the strongest form of 
state-to-state dispute resolution in operation—the sanctions in place 
are only prospective, meaning that a violating state that loses at the 
dispute-resolution phase and comes into compliance the moment be-
fore trade sanctions are to be imposed escapes without any obligation 
to compensate the complaining state and without any sanctions being 
imposed against it.127
One possible response to the weak system of sanctions is to give 
tribunals the authority to order the losing defendant to take some ad-
ditional costly action.  How would such a system impact the effective-
ness of the tribunal? 
125 For example, in 2002 an ICSID tribunal ordered Egypt to pay a private claim-
ant a total of just less than four million dollars.  Middle East Cement Shipping & Han-
dling Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 178 (Apr. 
12, 2002), reprinted in 18 ICSID REV. 602, 645 (2003). 
126 If the losing party refuses to comply, the winning party may be authorized to 
impose trade sanctions in response, but this is intended to encourage compliance with 
the ruling.  No penalty is imposed for the violation itself. 
127 See Monika Bütler & Heinz Hauser, The WTO Dispute Settlement System:  A First 
Assessment from an Economic Perspective, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 503, 527-28 (2000) (argu-
ing that the WTO’s system of delayed sanctions underdeters violations). 
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A remedy issued by an international tribunal increases the defen-
dant’s cost of complying with the ruling.  This is represented by an in-
crease in JD
C.  The same action also leads to an increase in the gain to 
the complainant, JC
C, if the defendant complies.  Assuming that the 
losing defendant complies with the ruling, then the expected cost of 
violating international law is increased, and therefore, the effective-
ness of the tribunal is increased.  Under these assumptions the com-
plainant gains more from the case, so its incentive to bring the com-
plaint in the first place is increased, and the defendant is more willing 
to settle so that the amount received by the complainant in settlement 
increases. 
Hypothesis:  If the losing defendant would comply with the ruling of a 
tribunal, then the imposition of remedies increases the effectiveness of 
the tribunal, increases the likelihood that a complainant will pursue 
litigation in response to a violation, and, if there is a settlement, leads 
to a more favorable outcome for the complainant.
Cases in which the defendant would refuse to comply with the tri-
bunal with or without the imposition of remedies are not affected by 
the tribunal’s imposition of remedies. 
Hypothesis:  If the losing defendant would refuse to comply in the ab-
sence of a remedies order, the use of remedies will have no additional 
impact on it or its incentive to comply.
Because the imposition of remedies increases the costs faced by a 
defendant that complies with the ruling, it is also more likely that a 
losing defendant will refuse to comply.128
Hypothesis:  All else equal, a defendant is more likely to refuse to com-
ply with a tribunal’s ruling if the ruling requires that it compensate 
the defendant in some way.
In those cases where a defendant would comply in the absence of 
a remedy being ordered but would refuse to do so if a remedy were 
ordered, the presence of those remedies may change the complain-
ant’s position.  If the defendant ignores the ruling the complainant 
receives a different payoff than if the defendant complies with the rul-
ing.  The discussion here is similar to the discussion of how a more 
128 It is conceivable that the obligation to compensate the defendant would in-
crease both the cost of compliance and the cost of noncompliance (the latter is as-
sumed to remain constant in the text).  The analysis in the text remains correct as long 
as this increase in costs is smaller than the increase in the cost of compliance, as seems 
very likely to be the case. 
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independent tribunal might increase the cost of compliance with the 
ruling.  In both circumstances, if a defendant chooses not to comply 
with the ruling the complainant’s payoff changes from JC
C to JC
NC.  This 
could, at least in theory, reduce the complainant’s incentive to pursue 
the case in the first place and, therefore, may reduce the effectiveness 
of the tribunal. 
As discussed in section IV.C, however, this result seems unlikely.  
The defendant can offer partial compliance, and unless the com-
plainant objects, the defendant will be perceived to be in compli-
ance.129  The complainant will only have an incentive to object if it can 
earn more by publicizing the defendant’s failure to comply fully. 
Thus, a carefully chosen set of actions by the defendant will ensure that 
the complainant is satisfied.  It follows that the complainant will do bet-
ter than it would under the noncompliant outcome and will retain at 
least some incentive to pursue the case when the violation takes place. 
Nevertheless, it remains possible that the parties will fail to nego-
tiate an acceptable solution after the tribunal’s ruling, in which case 
the presence of remedies may increase the defendant’s likelihood of 
noncompliance and reduce the complainant’s incentive to pursue 
litigation.
Because remedies only impact the cost of compliance with the tri-
bunal and not the cost associated with simply being found to be in vio-
lation (R) or the cost of refusing to comply with the tribunal ( JD
NC), 
concerns about undermining the complainant’s incentive to bring the 
case in the first place are more problematic with remedies than they 
are with increased independence.  If remedies increase the likelihood 
of noncompliance and thus undermine the credibility of the com-
plainant’s threat to litigate, the inclusion of remedies may do more 
harm than good.  If this is the case in many areas of international law, 
the absence of remedies in dispute resolution can be explained. 
However, there is no reason to think that the cost of remedies will 
outweigh the benefits in all circumstances.  We should expect to see 
remedies put in place where the remedies themselves are unlikely to 
cause the defendant to ignore the tribunal’s order.  This would be the 
case if the cost of noncompliance greatly outweighs the cost of com-
129 In many instances only the complainant will truly know whether the defendant 
has fully complied.  Even if other states know, as long as the complainant is satisfied, 
the observing states will view the defendant has having (adequately) complied with the 
tribunal. 
2008] International Tribunals 217
pliance (so an increase in the cost of compliance will not tip the los-
ing defendant into noncompliance). 
This balance of the cost of noncompliance outweighing the cost 
of compliance seems to best characterize investment arbitration.  Un-
der most bilateral investment treaties, a violating state faces the pros-
pect of third-party dispute resolution and an order to pay monetary 
damages to a winning complainant.  Though a state may be reluctant 
to pay, the key for a defendant is to preserve its reputation as a coun-
try that treats foreign investment well.  Should it fail to comply with 
the ruling, it risks scaring away other potential investors.  At least 
when the investment dispute is not too large, one would expect this 
cost of noncompliance to greatly exceed the cost of compliance, even 
if cash damages must be paid. 
E.  Should the Votes of Judges Be Public and  
Should Dissent Be Allowed? 
The extent to which the decision-making process of tribunals is 
made transparent to observers varies from one tribunal to another.  
The ICJ, for example, reports both the number of votes in favor of 
and against a ruling and how each individual judge voted.  In addi-
tion, judges who find themselves in the minority may issue dissenting 
opinions.130  At the WTO, in contrast, a ruling is normally reported 
without any information about whether there was disagreement 
among the judges or about which judges supported the decision. 
There are at least three different choices that a tribunal must 
make about the transparency of its decision process.  First, will the 
number of judges voting for each outcome be revealed?  Second, as-
suming the vote count is made public, will the individual votes of 
judges be revealed?  Finally, are dissenting opinions permitted? 
The impact of these choices can be discussed in terms of the 
analysis that has already taken place.  Consider first the consequence 
of keeping judges’ votes secret, meaning that not even the number of 
votes for a particular outcome will be revealed.  Observers will only 
learn the decision of the tribunal as a whole and there will be no dis-
sent.  This form of secrecy has two main consequences.  First, it in-
creases the independence of the judges.  If states cannot (or cannot 
130 See, for example, the dissenting opinions of Vice-President Weeramantry and 
Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, and Vereshchetin in Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.) 1998 
I.C.J. 432, at 496, 516, 553, 570 (Dec. 4). 
218 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 171
easily) identify how each judge voted, they cannot punish a judge for 
acting contrary to the state’s interests.  Judges are better able to make 
decisions on criteria other than the preferences of the state. 
Fully secret voting will also tend to reduce the amount of informa-
tion provided.  Observers will not know if it was a close decision—in 
which case, for example, a violation may be viewed more leniently by 
other states.  Secrecy is also likely to reduce the quality of the decision 
because potential dissenters cannot challenge the reasoning behind 
the ruling.  When the majority on a tribunal must craft a ruling that 
effectively competes with a dissent, it is forced to think harder about 
its position, which leads to better reasoning and, at times, can even al-
ter the decision. 
So, as one moves to increasingly transparent judicial decisions, the 
independence of judges will be reduced and the quality of the deci-
sion will improve.  Simply announcing the vote split without revealing 
specific votes of the judges would have a modest impact on both inde-
pendence (states would not know exactly which judges behaved which 
way) and quality (without dissenting opinions, the pressure to im-
prove the quality of reasoning is modest).  It would also have a signifi-
cant impact on the ability of states to determine whether or not the 
decision was close.  Announcing the judges’ individual votes would 
further reduce independence but would also increase quality, as 
judges would be more accountable for their votes.  Finally, allowing 
dissenting (or, for that matter, concurring) opinions would have the 
greatest positive impact on the quality of the reasoning. 
How one balances these different priorities cannot be determined 
without a better understanding of their relative tradeoffs.  In other 
words, how much independence is lost when voting patterns are re-
vealed?  Does this impact effectiveness more or less than the simulta-
neous increase in information transmission and quality?  These ques-
tions should be analyzed when a tribunal is formed. 
Hypothesis:  Increased transparency with respect to the voting of judges 
has an ambiguous impact on effectiveness.  It tends to increase effec-
tiveness by increasing the quality of decision making and accuracy of 
the information provided by the decision, but it also reduces the tribu-
nal’s effectiveness by reducing the independence of judges.
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F.  Extending the Model 
1.  Should There Be a Mandatory Consultation Period? 
Some dispute-resolution procedures have a mandatory period of 
consultation or negotiation before the more formal stages of litigation 
can begin.  The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, for exam-
ple, imposes a mandatory sixty-day consultation period before the 
complainant can request that a panel hear the case.131
The delay caused by this practice reduces the tribunal’s effective-
ness because it puts off the time at which the defendant must bear the 
cost of a violation.  Reducing the costs imposed on the defendant (as 
well as the gains to the complainant) makes politics more appealing to 
the complainant.  Put differently, delay reduces the appeal of litiga-
tion and, therefore, its effectiveness. 
Presumably, the purpose of these “cooling-off” periods is to in-
crease the likelihood of settlement.  In the model of dispute resolu-
tion developed thus far, the parties are rational and there are no 
transaction costs or informational asymmetries that would allow a 
mandatory consultation period to improve the likelihood of settlement. 
To consider mandatory consultations within the model, the zero-
transaction-cost and full-rationality assumptions can be relaxed.  Add-
ing transaction costs to the model is straightforward.  They can be 
thought of as some fixed cost, T, T > 0, which must be borne by each 
party in order to achieve a negotiated settlement.132  This cost makes it 
less likely that the parties will settle because the gains from settlement 
(i.e., the difference in total payoffs that the parties receive from set-
tling rather than going to a judgment) now must be enough to cover 
these transaction costs (i.e., they must be at least 2 × T ).
If we also add an assumption that mandatory consultations reduce 
T, then those consultations make settlement more appealing for both 
parties.133  Even with these assumptions, however, a mandatory consul-
131 DSU, supra note 18, art. 4, ¶ 7. The period can be shortened if both parties 
agree that consultations have failed.  The key element is that the complainant cannot 
unilaterally avoid this period of negotiation.  Id.
132 These costs do not have to be the same for both parties.  The complainant 
could face transaction costs of TC and the defendant, TD .  This would have no effect on 
the analysis, and so the discussion in the text assumes that the complainant and defen-
dant face the same transaction costs. 
133 In a model of rational states, mandating some form of negotiation cannot 
enhance the prospects for settlement, so a relaxation of the rationality assumption is 
required. 
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tation period reduces the effectiveness of the underlying legal rules 
and, therefore, of tribunals.  This is so because any settlement takes 
place in the shadow of the potential ruling.  Should the case go to a 
ruling, the delay associated with the mandatory consultation period 
reduces the expected cost to the defendant and, therefore, the incen-
tive to settle.  So even if the settlement takes place early, the defen-
dant is willing to give up less to achieve it.  Because an early settlement 
may generate value that the parties can share, mandatory consulta-
tions may leave the complainant better off, but they will not increase 
the cost to the defendant.134
Hypothesis:  Mandatory consultations reduce the effectiveness of the 
tribunal.
2.  Should Jurisdiction Be Mandatory? 
Up to this point, this Article has developed a model of interna-
tional tribunals with mandatory jurisdiction, and the results only apply 
to that category of tribunals. 
Mandatory jurisdiction changes the game that the parties to a dis-
pute are playing in a fundamental way.  It gives the complainant the 
power to decide if a case will be pursued through litigation rather 
than politics, regardless of what the defendant would prefer.  Con-
sider how things are different if both parties must agree to the use of a 
tribunal.  Parties must make such an agreement at the ICJ, for exam-
ple, in the absence of compulsory jurisdiction.135  The relevant game 
tree then looks like this: 
134 One caveat should be added.  If the complainant does better as a result of the 
mandatory consultation, it is more likely to pursue litigation rather than politics.  If 
litigation imposes higher costs on the defendant than politics, then the presence of 
mandatory consultations will increase the cost of violating international law for some 
(but not all) defendants. 
135 See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 36.2 (granting parties the ability to recog-
nize the power of the ICJ as compulsory). 
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Figure 2:  Dispute-Resolution Payoffs  
with Voluntary Jurisdiction 
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Figure 2 is identical to the game tree presented in Figure 1, ex-
cept that an additional stage has been added early in the game.  In 
that new stage, the defendant chooses whether to pursue politics or 
litigation.  In this system, litigation will be used only if it offers both 
the complainant and the defendant a higher payoff than politics 
would.  The defendant’s payoffs are, of course, the sanction it must 
pay if it violates international law.  Giving the defendant the power to 
prevent the use of the tribunal, then, allows that state to choose the 
smaller of the possible sanctions it will face.  State choice of sanctions, 
in turn, reduces the costs of violating the law and, therefore, the in-
centive to comply, making the tribunal less effective in generating 
compliance with the underlying substantive rules. 
There is one way that a tribunal without mandatory jurisdiction 
might nonetheless operate as effectively as one with mandatory juris-
diction.  A defendant that is wrongly accused of violating international 
law may prefer a tribunal over the alternative of politics because the 
tribunal may be the best way to demonstrate publicly that those accu-
sations are baseless. 
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If so, observing states may infer that states refusing to submit 
themselves to a tribunal are guilty of whatever violation the would-be 
complainant alleges.  The tribunal, then, may serve as a signaling 
mechanism that distinguishes violators from nonviolators.  This, in 
turn, generates costs for those states that refuse to use the tribunal—
in effect increasing the cost of using politics, PD.  That increased cost 
makes litigation more appealing, and the tribunal may, in fact, serve 
as an effective device for determining guilt.  Alternatively, a pooling 
equilibrium may emerge in which the parties always submit to the ju-
risdiction of the tribunal because a failure to do so will lead others to 
conclude that they are violators. 
There is, however, no guarantee that either of these situations will 
arise.  What may emerge instead is a pooling equilibrium in which 
cases never go to the tribunal because one of the parties always prefers 
politics.  Or, alternatively, the parties may occasionally use the tribu-
nal because the savings in the form of, say, lower transaction costs for 
settlement are large enough to make it worthwhile for both parties.  
In either of these situations, the absence of mandatory jurisdiction re-
duces the effectiveness of the tribunal. 
Though it is not possible to rule out the signaling story as a theo-
retical matter, I suspect that it is a secondary effect and that the main 
impact of mandatory jurisdiction on the effectiveness of a tribunal is 
positive.  With that in mind, I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis:  Mandatory jurisdiction is likely to increase the effective-
ness of a tribunal.
3.  Should Tribunals Constrain the Use of Politics? 
Up to this point it has been assumed that the presence of an in-
ternational tribunal does not affect the payoffs from politics, (PC, PD).
This subsection relaxes that assumption.  Though dispute-resolution 
provisions can specify that they represent the only forum in which the 
parties are permitted to pursue their disagreement, there is no practi-
cal way to prevent states from simply choosing to use conventional po-
litical means to address the issue.  The WTO rules regarding the set-
tlement of disputes, for example, specify that members shall not 
“make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred  . . . 
except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the 
rules and procedures of this Understanding.”136  Though this provi-
136 DSU, supra note 18, art. 23.2(a). 
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sion seeks to discourage states from pursuing alternative paths to re-
solve their disputes, there is no doubt that states often do exactly this. 
That said, the WTO system does limit the ability of a potential 
complainant to take unilateral action.  In the United States—Section
301-310 Panel Report,137 a WTO panel considered an American statute 
authorizing retaliatory action against foreign trade practices that the 
United States considers unfair, including WTO violations.  Europe 
claimed that this statute amounted to a violation of the above-quoted 
provision that identifies the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing as an exclusive mechanism.  The United States prevailed in the 
case, but only because there was no instance of unilateral retaliation at 
hand.  The WTO panel left no doubt that use of the statute to pre-
empt a WTO decision would be a violation.138  In this example, the 
dispute-resolution rules, at least arguably, cabined the ability of mem-
ber states to resort to unilateralism. 
If a tribunal is able to limit the political options of the complain-
ant as the WTO did in the above example, resorting to politics is less 
appealing to states.  This causes the complainant to opt for litigation 
more often, which, according to the model herein, reduces the com-
plainant’s payoff from politics, PC.
How does this impact the role of international law?  Reducing the 
payoff from politics gives the complainant fewer options and thus re-
duces its ability to react to perceived violations.  This makes it less 
likely that the complainant will pursue the matter in any forum (i.e., it 
may conclude that doing nothing is the best response), or it may pur-
sue litigation, even if it would have otherwise preferred politics. 
Because it is the payoff to the defendant that generates an incen-
tive to comply with international law, it is difficult to draw firm con-
clusions about how changes in the complainant’s payoffs affect these 
incentives.  It seems reasonable to assume, however, that giving the 
complainant more ways to address the issue increases the likelihood 
that violating international law imposes costs on the defendant.  This 
suggests that reducing the appeal of politics for the complainant also 
137 Panel Report, United States—Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
138 See id. at 7.61-7.63 (“[W]hen a Member adopts any legislation it has to be mind-
ful that it does not violate its WTO obligations.”). 
224 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 171
reduces the costs borne by the defendant (on average) and, therefore, 
the effectiveness of international law and the tribunal.139
Hypothesis:  Constraining the use of politics is likely to reduce the effec-
tiveness of international law and the tribunal.
Two caveats should be added.  First, discouraging the use of poli-
tics may increase the fairness in the system.  It is generally the case 
that more powerful countries are better able to use politics.  It may be 
desirable on fairness grounds to ensure, as much as possible, that 
more powerful countries play by the same rules as their weaker part-
ners.  Second, if constraining politics encourages states to use dispute 
settlement, it may lead to a more accurate determination of law and 
facts.  This will increase the importance of the underlying rule be-
cause a more accurate determination of a state’s culpability increases 
the difference between the costs of violation and compliance, thereby 
increasing the incentive to comply. 
V. TWO TRIBUNALS
As the Introduction promised, the analysis in this Article has been 
done at an abstract level.  This allows for a more general discussion 
and, therefore, yields insights that apply to a wide range of tribunals.  
The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not provide a contex-
tualized discussion of any particular tribunal.  This section offers a 
glimpse of what a more contextual analysis, informed by the lessons of 
this Article, might look like.  For brevity’s sake, the present section is 
limited to a short discussion of two tribunals. 
Before considering the particulars of any individual tribunal, it is 
important to understand that this Article does not claim to be able to 
fully predict or account for the effectiveness of any specific tribunal.  
Many contextual factors explain why tribunals work well or poorly.  To 
illustrate, the fact that the Appellate Body of the WTO addresses trade 
issues is of central importance to its effectiveness.  Trade relations, 
unlike areas such as human rights, often (though not always) rely on 
reciprocity to encourage compliance with international law.  It is thus 
sometimes easier to generate compliance with legal obligations in the 
139 When a dispute is pursued through politics rather than litigation, the tribunal 
has no explicit role to play.  It is nevertheless appropriate to say that the tribunal is 
more effective in the absence of an attempt to constrain the use of politics because it is 
the tribunal’s rules that alter the incentives of the parties and encourage or discourage 
them from using politics. 
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trade area than in the human rights area, and no tinkering with tri-
bunal design can change the basic strategic structure of these subject 
areas.
This Article attempts, instead, to shed light on how different de-
sign structures might impact effectiveness, holding other factors con-
stant.  Those other factors, such as the subject matter at issue, are of-
ten very important.  The analysis herein is thus better suited to 
address the question of how one might want to design a particular tri-
bunal rather than the question of which tribunals are most effective. 
Noting that these matters of design impact effectiveness at the 
margin makes it more difficult to carry out empirical analysis of the 
claims.  If we had large numbers of tribunals and a good proxy for ef-
fectiveness, it might be possible to examine their relative effectiveness 
through formal empirical tests.  We do not have large enough num-
bers for this approach, however, and so alternative strategies must be 
used.  Specifically, the most promising method for evaluating the 
claims made in this Article is qualitative rather than quantitative.  
Qualitative analysis enables investigation of the extent to which indi-
vidual design features improve the effectiveness of a particular tribunal. 
A.  The (Almost) Full Monty:  The WTO Appellate Body  
Among international tribunals, the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) is 
arguably the most like domestic courts.  It has compulsory jurisdiction 
over all WTO disputes; its judges are highly independent of state par-
ties; it issues legally binding decisions; it is capable of authorizing 
sanctions in response to violations; and judicial decisions are subject 
to appeal before a standing Appellate Body.  The WTO also attempts 
to prevent the use of extra-legal actions to resolve disputes, as dis-
cussed in subsection IV.F.3.  To be sure, there are many ways in which 
the AB differs from domestic systems—most importantly the lack of 
true enforcement power, as authorized sanctions are imposed only by 
the complainant (rather than by some supranational authority or by 
all members collectively). 
The AB is perceived to be quite effective, meaning that it pro-
motes compliance with the underlying legal rules.140  It is, of course, 
difficult to determine how much compliance with the substantive 
140 See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials:  Why Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 120 (describ-
ing the WTO system as a “stringent and effective dispute-resolution system”). 
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rules can be attributed to the dispute-resolution system itself, rather 
than other features of the agreement.  As mentioned above, the trad-
ing system has the advantage that reciprocity plays an important role 
in supporting the relevant obligations. 
Turning to the design features discussed in the Article, we can 
consider how the AB matches up with our criteria for effectiveness.  
The signature features of the dispute-resolution process are its manda-
tory nature—the defendant cannot prevent the case from moving for-
ward—and the potential for economic sanctions.  Mandatory dispute 
resolution clearly increases effectiveness under the model developed 
in this Article, as it would under any reasonable model. 
It is rare for international tribunals to impose sanctions on parties, 
which makes the WTO’s mechanism unusual in this respect.  It is also 
quite different from a standard contractual remedy under domestic 
law because it does not provide for compensatory sanctions of any 
kind.  A state that loses before a tribunal is required to bring itself into 
compliance, but it faces no economic sanctions if it agrees to do so.  If 
it refuses to come into compliance, however, the complainant can re-
quest the authorization to suspend concessions, which means impos-
ing trade sanctions, limited to the amount of the ongoing injury.141
The Article notes that the imposition of remedies has an ambiguous 
impact on effectiveness.  The WTO has structured its remedies, how-
ever, in a way that ensures improved effectiveness.  The defendant 
does not face sanctions when it loses before the tribunal; it faces them 
only if it refuses to comply with the ruling.  This increases the cost of 
ignoring the tribunal without increasing the cost of complying with it, 
and has an unambiguously positive impact on effectiveness. 
The failure to impose retrospective sanctions reduces the deter-
rence effect of the legal rules, because a state can violate its obliga-
tions, lose a case, and then eliminate the violation without suffering 
any explicit penalty.  This system falls well short of a system of optimal 
damages designed to discourage inefficient breach.142  This aspect of 
the dispute settlement system—a relatively low level of sanctions—
141 DSU, supra note 18, art. 22.4. 
142 See, e.g., Bütler & Hauser, supra note 127, at 538 (discussing how the lack of ef-
fective sanctions and the complainant’s agenda-setting powers weaken the clout of the 
system); Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement Implemen-
tation Procedures:  A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 709, 712-13, 729 
(2000) (exploring how interpretive issues concerning compliance deadlines, compli-
ance review, and requests to suspend concessions have diminished the effectiveness of 
the WTO). 
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clearly undermines effectiveness because it reduces the cost of a viola-
tion.  One possible reason to nevertheless structure the sanctions in 
this way is to increase the difference between the cost of complying 
with the tribunal and the cost of ignoring it.  By increasing the cost of 
ignoring the tribunal, we increase the expected cost of the underlying 
violation and the likelihood that the defendant will comply with the 
ruling.  Those increases, in turn, avoid the key problem of remedies—
namely, that the presence of remedies will make more defendants ig-
nore the ruling.143  The particular way in which the WTO authorizes 
remedies unambiguously increases effectiveness relative to a system 
without remedies. 
The AB also scores very high on two other factors discussed in this 
Article:  independence and quality.  The AB is a permanent body 
made up of seven judges, each of whom is appointed to a four-year 
term that can be renewed once.  The judge’s country is unable to re-
move her, affect her compensation, or otherwise punish her for unfa-
vorable rulings.  Allowing judges to sit on cases involving their home 
states does not appear to have caused any serious problems, claims of 
bias, or lack of independence.144
The decisions of the AB are adopted unless the Dispute Settle-
ment Body, to which all member states belong (including the winning 
state in the case), rejects adoption by consensus.  Thus, the decision is 
virtually certain to be adopted and, once adopted, there is no mecha-
nism short of a new AB decision or a decision by member states to 
overturn it.145
It is more difficult to clearly measure the quality of AB judges, but 
it is perhaps instructive that discussions about the quality of judges at 
the WTO typically focus on the panelists that rule on disputes in the 
first instance rather than on the AB judges.  In general, it is fair to say 
that the quality of AB judges is perceived to be very high, further in-
creasing effectiveness. 
The WTO’s dispute-resolution process reduces effectiveness in at 
least two ways.  First, the votes of judges on panels and on the AB gen-
erally are not disclosed and dissenting opinions are not used.  Al-
143 One could achieve something closer to efficient remedies by further increasing 
the permissible sanctions when the defendant refuses to comply with the tribunal. 
144 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006) (featur-
ing Merit Janow, a U.S. citizen, as one of the AB members hearing the case). 
145 Other features supporting independence include the ability of third parties to 
participate in the process and a secretariat able to provide assistance to the judges. 
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though neither the Dispute Settlement Understanding nor the Appel-
late Body Working Procedures prohibit dissenting opinions, they do 
discourage them.  The Working Procedures, for example, state that 
“[t]he Appellate Body and its divisions shall make every effort to take 
their decisions by consensus.”146  To date, there has been only one dis-
senting opinion and one concurring opinion produced in AB deci-
sions.147  Whatever the reasons for the absence of dissents, it seems 
likely that the failure to provide dissents undermines the tribunal’s ef-
fectiveness.148  The theory developed in this Article points out that 
permitting dissents may reduce the independence of judges and the 
tribunal, but the independence of AB judges is sufficiently well-
established to make this a minor concern.  The beneficial effects—in 
the form of clearer and more carefully thought-out decisions—seem 
quite likely to outweigh the independence concerns. 
The WTO provides a mandatory consultation period of sixty days.  
During this time, the complainant cannot request the establishment 
of a panel unless the defendant consents or fails to enter into consul-
tations.149  This policy negatively impacts effectiveness simply because 
it produces delay.  If states are fully rational, there is nothing to be 
gained from this mandatory consultation period because the parties 
will negotiate for as long as they deem worthwhile.  If one assumes 
some irrationality among the parties, however, this process may in-
crease the likelihood of settlement.  As long as the parties’ discount 
rates are not too high, a short period of mandatory consultations may, 
therefore, be beneficial. 
Finally, the WTO seeks to constrain the use of politics by stating 
that members shall “not make a determination to the effect that a vio-
lation has occurred” except through the dispute-resolution system.150
As already discussed, this limits one option available to a complainant 
and, in this sense, reduces the effectiveness of the tribunal.  As also 
mentioned, however, reducing the role of politics may serve both 
146 World Trade Organization, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/5 
at Rule 3.2 (2005). 
147 The dissent is in Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cot-
ton, ¶ 631, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).  The concurrence is in Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, ¶ 149, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
148 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 895, 903 (2006) (offering explanations for the lack of dissenting and 
concurring opinions). 
149 DSU, supra note 18, art. 3. 
150 Id. art. 23.2. 
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fairness and accuracy goals and so may be justified despite any impact 
on effectiveness. 
Overall, then, the WTO appears to be structured in a way that is 
consistent with the design criteria that maximize effectiveness.  The 
one area where there appears to be room to increase effectiveness is 
that of dissenting opinions.  By encouraging more dissents, the AB 
would increase the quality and clarity of its decisions and would signal 
the views of the judges more clearly, all of which, in turn, would in-
crease effectiveness. 
B.  The Power Grab:  The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
Although the HRC satisfies our definition of a tribunal (a disin-
terested institution to which the parties have delegated some author-
ity, and that produces a statement about the facts of a case and opines 
on how those facts relate to relevant legal rules), it is different from 
the WTO’s AB or the ICJ because it has sought to exert authority that 
is quite clearly beyond that contemplated in its founding document, 
the ICCPR.  In this sense, the HRC might be described as a maverick 
tribunal.  Whether attempts by the HRC to increase its influence are 
good or bad depends on one’s perspective, though it is not necessary 
for the purposes of this Article to take a position on that normative 
question.  What interests us here is that the tribunal has exceeded a 
reasonable interpretation of its founding charge in attempting to ex-
ert influence on states. 
Interestingly, efforts by the HRC to increase its influence have 
been met with some success.  Whatever criticisms one might level at 
the HRC, it is taken seriously by states and commentators and appears 
to have influence even in areas where it lacks formal authority to take 
action.151
If the committee lacks coercive enforcement and if states have not 
consented to its current set of actions, why do they listen at all?  The 
answer is that the HRC has managed to position itself as a tribunal 
and retain independence from the parties to a dispute.  As a result, it 
is able to provide useful information to the international community.  
This information, in turn, serves the same purpose as a judgment 
from any other tribunal. 
151 See, e.g., David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1, 19 (2006) (“[L]ower [United States federal] courts have held that the decisions of 
the Human Rights Committee constitute persuasive authority for interpreting provi-
sions of the ICCPR.”). 
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The HRC, in other words, is an example of a tribunal with non-
binding rulings that can nevertheless influence states.  This is pre-
cisely what the theory developed earlier suggests—the rulings of a 
nonbinding tribunal can have the same effect as those of a binding 
tribunal, at least with respect to statements regarding the legality of a 
particular action.  It is only when the tribunal demands some action 
(including the termination of illegal conduct) that a binding tribunal 
is more effective.152
The HRC was established under Article 28 of the ICCPR.  HRC 
members are nominated by their home state and then elected by the 
parties to the ICCPR.153  They serve four-year terms after which they 
can be renominated by their state and reelected by the parties to the 
Convention.  HRC members are made more independent by the fact 
that they do not participate in the consideration of reports submitted 
by their home states or in the adoption of concluding observations re-
lating to these reports.154
The formal role of the HRC, as laid out in the ICCPR, is quite 
modest.  Under Article 40 the HRC is charged with studying reports 
from parties to the ICCPR on the measures those states have adopted 
that give effect to the rights recognized under the ICCPR.155  It is to 
“transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider 
appropriate, to the States Parties.”156  In addition, Article 41 and the 
First Optional Protocol give parties the option of recognizing the 
competence of the HRC to (i) “receive and consider communications 
to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations”157 and (ii) receive and consider communica-
tions from individuals subject to the party’s jurisdiction “who claim to 
be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth 
in the Covenant.”158
152 See supra Part II.C (demonstrating that the impact of a tribunal’s decision on 
the legality of an action is unrelated to the bindingness of its ruling). 
153 ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 30.4. 
154 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. 8-9, available at http://www.ohchr. 
org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf. 
155 ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 40.1. 
156 Id. art. 40.4. 
157 Id. art. 41. 
158 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter  
Optional Protocol]. 
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With respect to interstate complaints, should the parties fail to re-
solve their disagreement, the HRC is authorized to submit a report, 
but it “shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts.”159  A 
mechanism to establish a more conventional form of tribunal to rule 
on the dispute exists (an “ad hoc Conciliation Commission”), but it 
requires the consent of the parties at the time of its establishment. 
For disputes between individual complainants and states that have 
accepted the First Optional Protocol, the HRC has a more conven-
tional judicial role.  After receiving a communication from an indi-
vidual complainant and a response from the relevant state, the HRC is 
to “forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.”160
Simply reading the ICCPR does not provide an accurate sense of 
the influence that the HRC actually has on the interpretation of hu-
man rights obligations and of the claims the HRC makes about its own 
authority.  For illustration, consider two of the more aggressive asser-
tions of HRC authority, both of which are included in the HRC’s 
General Comment 24.161
One of these claims to authority states that the “[t]he [HRC’s] 
role under the Covenant, whether under Article 40 or under the Op-
tional Protocols, necessarily entails interpreting the provisions of the 
Covenant and the development of a jurisprudence.”162  This must be 
true if the HRC is acting as a tribunal and evaluating actions in light 
of relevant laws.  It is not obvious, however, that Article 40 of the 
ICCPR gives the HRC that power.  Under Article 40, the HRC is in-
structed to “transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may 
consider appropriate.”163  Nothing in this language suggests that the 
HRC is entitled to offer authoritative interpretations of the treaty or to 
establish a jurisprudence. 
The second claim made by the HRC is more substantive and re-
lates to the treatment of reservations.  To begin with, the HRC states 
that “[i]t necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a 
specific reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the 
159 ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 41.1(h)(ii).  The HRC must also attach the written 
submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the disputing parties.  Id. 
160 Optional Protocol, supra note 158, art. 5.4. 
161 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Comm., Vol. 1, Annex V, 
U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Feb. 4, 1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 
898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/bbd592d8d48a76fec12563f000586adc/$FILE/
N9602481.pdf.
162 Id. at General Comment No. 24, art. 11. 
163 ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 40.4. 
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Covenant.”164  Once again, nothing in the treaty indicates that the 
HRC has been given this task.  A more plausible reading is that reser-
vations to the ICCPR should be governed by the relevant rules in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), as is the case for 
reservations to any other treaty. 
Having laid claim to the authority to address reservations, the 
HRC then asserts that the VCLT is “inappropriate to address the prob-
lem of reservations to human rights treaties.”165  Instead, the HRC pre-
scribes alternative substantive rules to govern reservations.  Unaccept-
able reservations, for example, are “severable, in the sense that the 
Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of 
the reservation.”166  This idea is contrary to the normal Vienna Con-
vention rule under which neither such a reservation nor the treaty 
provisions to which it extends apply between the states.167
These claims by the HRC did not go unnoticed and were met with 
protests from some quarters.  The United States, for example, re-
sponded that the ICCPR “does not impose on States Parties an obliga-
tion to give effect to the Committee’s interpretations or confer on the 
Committee the power to render definitive or binding interpretations 
of the Covenant.”168  Nevertheless, the suggestions were not simply 
dismissed out of hand.  Instead they have become a part of the ongo-
ing human-rights debate.169
To the degree that the HRC is extending its authority when it de-
clares, through its General Comments or statements of views under 
Article 41, that states have certain obligations, it is increasing the bur-
den on states that wish to comply with these nonbinding statements.  
In our model, this corresponds to an increase in the cost of compli-
ance, JD
C, and can lead to an increase in the incentive to comply with 
164  Human Rights Comm., supra note 161, at General Comment No. 24,(52), ¶ 18. 
165 Id. at ¶ 17. 
166 Id. at ¶ 18. 
167 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1195 U.N.T.S. 331. 
168 Observations of States Parties under Article 40, paragraph 5, of the Covenant 
on General Comment No. 24(52); accord Human Rights Comm., supra note 161, at 
Annex VI.  France and Britain similarly responded to and disagreed with the HRC’s 
claims in General Comment 24.  Id.
169 See Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24:  Confronting the Problem of Reservations to 
Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 277 (1999) (assessing the importance of 
General Comment 24 as it relates both to the ICCPR and previously established stan-
dards for reservations); Sarah Joseph, A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. Winter 1999, at 57, 67-69 (explaining the impact of 
ICCPR obligations on individual and state rights). 
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the relevant human-rights obligations.  To work, however, the in-
creased cost of compliance must not be so large as to cause states to 
simply ignore the tribunal. 
The HRC has two tools at its disposal to try to avoid this result.  
First, it can attempt to increase the cost of refusing to comply with 
views of the HRC ( JD
NC in our model).  It is clear that the HRC has 
pursued this strategy aggressively.  In cases under the First Optional 
Protocol, for example, the HRC not only forwards its views regarding 
a complaint to the relevant state party, but also typically requests that 
the state provide it with “information about the measures taken to give 
effect to the Committee’s Views.”170  The HRC also requires that state 
reports under Article 40 of the ICCPR indicate what steps state parties 
have taken to comply with the HRC’s views in such cases.171
In addition to self-reporting by states, the HRC has established a 
“Special Rapporteur for follow up” who is charged with “ascertaining 
the measures taken by States parties to give effect to the Committee’s 
views.”172  The Rapporteur must report to the HRC regularly, and the 
HRC is to include information about these follow-up activities in its 
annual report.173
By requesting or demanding follow-up information (whether self-
reported or gathered by the Rapporteur), the HRC is attempting to 
make a state’s refusal to comply with the HRC’s demands more trans-
parent.  Though these demands are not binding on the state, ignoring 
them can be costly, and greater transparency increases that cost. 
A second way in which the HRC can discourage states from refus-
ing to comply with its rulings is to moderate its demands.  If the in-
crease in the cost of compliance is kept modest, it is less likely that 
states will ignore the tribunal.  In other words, the HRC has an incen-
tive to not go too far.  The HRC appears to be at least somewhat sensi-
tive to this concern, as evidenced by the fact that even as it has sought 
to expand its authority, it has, for example, avoided openly criticizing 
170 See, e.g., Views of the HRC under art. 5, para. 4 of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, (Gridin, Ctr. for Assistance to the Int’l Prot. v. Russ. Fed’n) Communication 
No. 770/1970, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997 (28 Jul.). 
171 See Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 5 U.N.Y.B. 341, 353 
(2001) (finding violations of the ICCPR and reminding the state party of its continuing 
obligations under the covenant). 
172 ICCPR, Human Rights Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee,
R. 95, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.6 (Apr. 24, 2001). 
173 Id.
234 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 171
states for failures to comply with the ICCPR.174  Sensitivity to the limits 
of its ability to generate compliance moderates the demands of the 
HRC, and this, in turn, reduces the risk that states will simply ignore 
its decisions. 
The above discussion explains why the HRC has been able to ex-
pand its role and still provide an incentive for states to take it seriously.  
One might wonder why states tolerate this.  After all, the states chose to 
set up the HRC with the limited authority specified in the ICCPR 
rather than with the authority that the HRC is currently exercising. 
One possibility is that the attitude of states has changed, and they 
now support a more active HRC.  Even if that is not the case, however, 
states may be unable to agree on a specific response to the activist 
HRC.  Any change to the HRC would require the consent of all states, 
and so even if only a few states support the HRC’s activities, it is 
enough to frustrate reform efforts.  Other states could, and, in fact, 
many states have, simply refused to submit declarations under Article 
41 or the First Optional Protocol.175  To avoid the obligation to submit 
reports to the HRC would be more difficult and may require with-
drawal from the ICCPR altogether.  Needless to say, this would be a 
more extreme action that states would not take lightly. 
CONCLUSION
There are precious few tools available to the international com-
munity to encourage compliance with international obligations.  The 
international tribunal is one such tool, and one that seems to be gain-
ing in popularity.  If tribunals are to be used wisely, however, the way 
in which they affect state decisions must be understood more com-
pletely.  This Article is a step toward that deeper understanding.  
Many open questions remain, and this is certainly not the last word on 
the subject.  What the piece does offer, however, is a systematic and 
174 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 340 (noting that the Committee tries 
not to engage in direct criticism when dealing with individual states’ failure to comply 
with treaty obligations). 
175 Of the 160 parties to the ICCPR, 109 are also party to the First Optional Proto-
col, though many of those 109 have accepted the protocol subject to significant reser-
vations—including two states (Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago) that initially signed 
the protocol and subsequently withdrew only to rejoin subject to reservations.  See Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR New York 16 December 1966, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ 
ratification/5.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (displaying the dates on which partici-
pants became parties and signatories). 
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coherent theoretical approach to the subject.  By focusing not only on 
how a dispute is handled once in the hands of the tribunal, but also 
on how states react both before and after a tribunal gets involved, this 
Article helps us to appreciate the relationship between the tribunal 
and the rest of the legal system. 
The starting point of the analysis is an assumption about exactly 
what tribunals are intended to achieve.  Specifically, they are intended 
to increase compliance with the relevant underlying substantive rules.  
With this objective in mind, this Article examines how various choices 
with respect to the design of a tribunal alter its effectiveness. 
Beyond setting forth lessons for designing a more effective tribu-
nal, I hope that this Article encourages those writing and working on 
tribunals to keep the theoretical structure developed herein in mind 
as they work.  It is important not to lose sight of the peculiar features 
of international tribunals and to avoid the easy mistake of analogizing 
too quickly to domestic tribunals.  International tribunals are simply 
tools to produce a particular kind of information.  If we recognize this 
fact, appreciate the content of the information likely to be produced, 
and evaluate how states will respond to it, there is reason to hope that 
we can make international tribunals a more valuable part of the inter-
national legal system. 
